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Analysis Europe
Hollande Presidency to End with a Whimper
December 2, 2016
Summary
President Francois Hollande has decided not to run in upcoming presidential elections in April 2017, clearing the Socialist field for a candidate with a little more pull with the French electorate. Finding one won’t be difficult given Hollande’s world-beating unfavorable ratings. In May of this year, Hollande broke the record for least popular president in the Fifth Republic’s history. His ratings have since dipped to as low as 4%.
Hollande’s stepping down could be consequential in both French domestic politics and the wider mood throughout the EU. It’s most immediate impact will be to provide a boost to those wanting to see Marine Le Pen locked out of executive power. But there’s still a long way to go, and a lot can change in five months.
EU: Talking, Not Doing
August 29, 2016
EU leaders will meet in the Slovak capital on Sept. 16 to discuss the future of the organization. They will just meet, talk, have lunch, take pictures and say goodbye to each other. Once again nothing will happen, nothing will change. The fact is the EU leaders really do not know what actions to take but need to portray activity. Europeans are beginning to get used to the uselessness and ineffectiveness of such pathetic and costly events.
Meanwhile, the most vital issues on the European agenda include Great Britain’s leaving, regional security, and immigration. Today it is absolutely clear that Brexit won’t dominate the upcoming European Union summit, though the other two topics will be at the center of attention. Now it is difficult to say from what point of view the leaders are going to touch upon them because they all directly depend on London’s decision to leave the EU.
It is impossible to ignore the fact that the necessity to make changes to the international security system is urgent. The appropriate decision can no longer be postponed. The existing instruments, such as Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), do not function any longer and the alternative ones have not been developed yet. According to Germany’s Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, it is high time to revive arms control in Europe and try to build bridges. Obviously, it is Europe who should be very active in this process; the European leaders should be more independent in decision-making and developing new instruments and mechanisms to advance the regional security system.
The matter is that the only organization the Europeans consider as intended for international security is NATO. But it should be noted that international security is not the same as European security. The United States bears the main financial burden and it is absolutely logical and understandable that this particular country leads the security policy and chooses the priorities. Europe is only part of their agenda. There is also Africa, Asia, and Middle East. All of these troubled regions need Washington’s attention too.
It is not Russia or the U.S. or NATO who are responsible for European security, but Europe itself. The superpowers have their own vision on regional security issue and will for sure present their plans. But these new strategies will be their plans, convenient and profitable only to them, not to Europe. Are European leaders really happy with this state of affairs? And if they are, is it Ok for the Europeans?
It’s fair to say Europe is actively discussing the creation of its own armed forces. Some experts say that this project makes no sense at all. Critics insist that the project is only an attempt to fuel the arms industry, most notably that of the U.S. Others are in favor of the idea, considering it as a possibility to maintain independent European politics. It could be a step towards a multipolar world or just wasting money. In any case it is worth listening to Frank-Walter Steinmeier and trying to seek European methods of regional development.
Brexit: Could a Messy Divorce Damage NATO?
July 11, 2016
Markus Heinrich and Lisdey Espinoza Pedraza
The ceremonies to commemorate the centenary of the Battle of the Somme were a sombre reminder of Europe’s blood-soaked history. The ironic coincidence that they almost exactly coincided with the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union will not have been lost on European leaders attending these events. The EU, after all, was devised to pacify Europe once and for all and make war between European countries impossible. As such, it has been one of the cornerstones of peace and stability in Europe, the other cornerstone being NATO.
But as the ramifications of the UK’s exit from the EU and the myriad potential problems, pitfalls, and divisions that this process could trigger – or once again force to the surface – begin to become clear, the question can be asked: how will this affect the relationship of NATO allies and the cohesion and stability of the Alliance? If the UK’s divorce from the EU becomes a messy and painful affair it will strain relations between the two and could spill over into the NATO realm. NATO’s integrity being vulnerable may sound far-fetched, but not long ago so too did the UK leaving the EU.
The United Divided
The interests of the EU are now to keep the rest of the bloc together and dissuade other member states with significant Euroskeptic movements from following the UK’s example. It is therefore probable that once the UK triggers Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon to officially begin the withdrawal process, and negotiate its new relationship with the EU, the latter will prove a tough negotiator as it will want to set an example that leaving comes at a cost.
The political reality is that, sadly, the UK paying a heavy price is now in the EU’s political interest. While some EU leaders like Angela Merkel have stated that there is no need to get nasty in the negotiations, others within the bloc have not been so conciliatory.
Rebuffing claims of prominent Leave campaigners regarding access to the common market, Dutch Foreign Minister Bert Koenders stated “it is very clear. You’re either in or you’re out. You can’t have the cake and eat it,” and even Merkel herself stated that the UK can’t “cherry-pick.” What most EU leaders agree on is that the UK should trigger Article 50 as soon as possible to begin the process of withdrawal to avoid a prolonged period of uncertainty and the negative financial, as well as political, consequences this entails.
Diplomatic Fallout Begins
The emergency meeting of foreign ministers from the EU’s six founding states – Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – following the UK referendum revealed impatience and diplomatic tensions with Britain. France is particularly impatient, and it is not only strictly EU issues that the French are raising but also the knock-on effects of Brexit. As a consequence of the UK voting to leave, the mayor of Calais wants changes to the deal which allows Britain to carry out immigration checks on the French side of the English Channel. Under the 2003 Le Touquet treaty, Britain can carry out checks in Calais to stop migrants trying to get to the UK.
Spain is also looking to jointly govern Gibraltar following the British vote. Gibraltar has been a British territory since 1713 and is a major point of contention in Anglo-Spanish relations. Spain has long claimed sovereignty over the enclave and this could be the chance the Spanish government has been waiting for.
Recognizing the complex diplomatic stumbling blocks facing Europe, US officials have weighed in to soothe fears on both sides of the Atlantic as the aftershocks of Brexit continue to rattle markets and governments. The reality is that a successful, secure, and united Europe is in the interests of all stakeholders in Euro-Atlantic security, and hence tensions within the collective have wide-ranging implications, not just for economics but also for security.
Tensions Transferred
The danger exists that strains caused by a painful and messy UK exit from the EU will have an impact on NATO relations. There are already, it could be argued, simmering tensions within the Alliance regarding Europe’s contribution to its capabilities with some members, particularly the U.S., accusing Europe of “free-riding.” As the UK is one of the few European Alliance members that actually spend the recommended 2 percent on defense, these tensions could be exacerbated should Brexit negotiations prove bitter.
The threat of European bickering turning into recriminations, or even hostility, was recognized by US Secretary of State John Kerry, who traveled to Europe and urged leaders “not to lose their head” and warned against anger leading to either side “cutting off their nose to spite their face”. These unprecedented political challenges come at a time when security conditions require NATO to present a strong and united front, as uncertainty and division could embolden opportunistic external forces to take advantage of such division.
More Europe, less NATO?
Another factor worth considering is that the traditional EU response to crisis has been calls for “more Europe,” as more cooperation and deeper integration are seen as a solution to tackling systemic problems. Many experts for example have long claimed that the euro surviving in the long run necessitates fiscal integration within the eurozone, because the strategy of kicking the can down the road through a series of mega bailouts has not solved the problem. The uncertainty that Brexit has created – combined with its implications for the EU’s legitimacy and ultimately its integrity – could see renewed calls for deeper integration of the remaining 27 members. Should the “more Europe” path be chosen, deeper integration would, presumably, also add impetus to the EU’s defense identity, currently in the form of the Common Security and Defence Policy or CSDP.
As the UK has been vehemently opposed to a CSDP, claiming it undermines NATO, any moves in that direction would increase the rift. The plausibility of this possibility must be viewed against the backdrop of political events in the United States. Should republican candidate Donald Trump – whose world view is similar to that of the more right-wing elements of the UK’s “Brexiteers,” as well as being scathing of Europe’s NATO contribution – become the next president, NATO could increasingly be made up of two camps. On the one hand its EU members moving towards deeper integration and a CSDP and, on the other, the US and the UK, who together bring the majority of NATO’s capability.
On balance and in summary, a look at the overall picture suggests European cooperation has reached a point where it can overcome a shock even as big as Brexit. Likewise, the U.S., the UK and EU Alliance members have continuously reaffirmed their commitment to their defense ties and NATO as the framework for same. Nevertheless, both sides in the long and extremely difficult UK exit negotiations that lie ahead will need to keep not only the particulars of the UK leaving the EU in mind, but also wider considerations, namely its impact on the unity of the West and the ultimate guarantor of that unity – NATO.
The Brexit and How Democracy Works in Mysterious Ways
June 30, 2016
To understand dispassionately the meaning of the Brexit vote we need to consider if it was a genuinely democratic decision.
Referendums are not common in British politics and it is being argued, by leading members of the Remain camp, that they are not legally binding as Parliament is sovereign and, therefore, any future parliament cannot be denied of its right to amend or repeal previous legislation. While this could be a fascinating discussion on constitutional matters, there are abundant precedents in Britain on the usage and legal validity of referendums. Both Labour and Conservative parties have appealed to the people through referendums in the past, including several ones on devolution arranged by the Labour government of 1997-2010. It was the government led by Tony Blair who put the framework for the running of future referendums through the Electoral Commission. No decisions taken through referendums have been challenged by Parliament in the past.
33.5 million electors participated in the Brexit referendum, with a turnout in excess of 72%, the highest in the UK since the 1992 parliamentary elections and more than twice British participation in the last EU parliament elections (historically never higher that 38.5%). 17.4 million citizens chose Brexit, the largest ever number of votes in favor of a political cause or party in Britain’s history (until now, the largest vote was 14 million achieved by the Conservative Party also in 1992). Contrary to elections where proportional representation rules, each vote across the UK had the same weight, and this explains that 51.9% of the individual votes went for Brexit against Parliament support for the same being below 25%. Although in percentage terms the difference that swung victory was less than 2%, the margin in favor of Brexit was in excess of 1.2 million people. People from the entire political spectrum voted to Leave, ignoring traditional party lines; however, the widely different age composition for or against Brexit deserves special examination. It is being argued, quiet convincingly, that the Labour constituency in North England was one of the key driving forces for Brexit, despite the official line in favor of Remain taken by the vast majority of Labour party officials.
The entire referendum campaign was contested over a four month period, much longer than the average duration of a British parliamentary campaign. Regardless of criticism on the quality of the debate and the veracity of key election themes raised by each camp, there was an unprecedented involvement of so-called third party experts, individual or institutional, mainly in favor of the Remain camp, including most of the entire Western political and international financial establishment headed by the Presidents of the U.S. and France, Germany’s Chancellor, the IMF head, several of NATO’s former top commanders and CEOs of the largest international banks. Similar to consumer warning labels, a long list of potential adverse consequences were laid out by the Remain camp concerning economic growth, employment, pensions, taxation, the pound, house prices and international trade should Brexit win the day. The barrage of warnings against Grexit during last year’s debate was children’s game compared to what we heard in Britain during the last few months.
During the entire Brexit campaign the odds against the Leave camp were consistently high not only among opinion polls (whatever they are now worth it) but also among the very British traditional betting business. To win an election against the status quo in a primarily middle-class country is an uphill battle. The senseless murder of an MP actively supporting the Remain campaign the week before decision day was seen by many as the watershed that would finally tip the election in favor of the In side, but this was not the case (even Kirklees, the constituency of the slain MP Jo Cox voted in favor of Leave).
And yet, three recent post-referendum developments deserve special attention and make us wonder if the British people do understand after all what democracy is all about.
A petition requesting Parliament to reconsider the validity of the results of the Brexit referendum on the grounds that it did not achieve a ‘qualified’ majority in terms of percentage of support and attendance has so far reached 4mm signatories. An impressive number indeed if the signatories are authentic (the House of Commons has invalidated a few thousand petitioners coming from North Korea and Vatican City), but which will have zero legal consequences as it defies common sense. The futility of this effort sadly brings back memories of the Children’s Crusade.
Based on the age breakdown of the Brexit vote, with younger people massively favoring the Remain camp and older ones the Leave side of the table, it has now become fashionable to claim that the older generations have robbed this election and severely curtailed the opportunities of the young people. As life expectancy averages would make younger generations face for much longer the consequences of the Brexit decision, such unfairness is being insinuated as grounds for questioning the validity of the referendum.
Last but not least, a few Labour MPs are asking the UK Parliament (informally until now) to reject the results of the referendum claiming that it was just an advisory, non-binding consultation.
While most social historians would confidently argue that democracy has positively evolved in the last 2500 years, making people’s participation in government decision making more genuine and effective, the initiatives and arguments just mentioned makes us wonder if in 21st century Britain we want to go back to the old days. Since in Ancient Greece the political ranking of citizens had to do with the value of owned property, shouldn’t we then perhaps qualify each vote on the basis of who is mostly affected by it? Or shall we rearrange population groups on tribes, like in Consular Rome, and make decisions that way?
Beyond dubious constitutional, political and realpolitik grounds, the suggestion that the UK Parliament should revoke the referendum is probably the most ominous one and should be thrown into a dustbin of bad humor political anecdotes. With the same logic used by the MPs proposing this revocation, the EU Parliament should ultimately supersede the sovereignty of the British parliament, which is something that the Eurocrats have been doing assiduously in the last few years. It is quite revealing to hear the European Commission President Juncker lecturing European politicians last May to ignore their electorates and saying ‘If you are listening to your national opinion you are not developing what should be a common European sense.’
Instead of wasting efforts questioning the Brexit decision, perhaps the losing side should look for the reasons behind Brexit as a lesson to the political classes, not only in Britain but around the world. The Brexit win cannot be simplified as the triumph of old, rural, small-minded, nostalgic and xenophobic England. We need, for instance, to look at the wealth gap (in terms of income and asset ownership) that keeps widening not only in Britain but across the world. We also need to look back at the unfairness of taxation; younger generations, truly addicted to avant garde gadgetry, social media and the web, should learn that recently Apple just paid £17mm of taxes on £1.3 billion of UK revenues and Facebook £4,327 (no hidden zeros). This reminds us of the tax-free paying aristocracy at the eve of the French Revolution. Perhaps we are lucky that the Brexit decision is a bloodless upheaval and, in true British fashion, less anarchistic and destructive that most social changes that have happened in Europe in its history.
Whoever accuses Britain of backwardness utterly ignores the contributions of British society towards human progress through, for instance, the movements to abolish slavery and to give electoral vote to women. Whoever accuses Britain of intolerance should remember that Marx, Engels and Ho Chi Minh settled in London (as Bolivar, San Martin and Miranda also did at the eve of the South American independence wars). We should also remember that even Bonaparte, at the end of his political life, wanted to settle in this country that once had contemptuously called at the peak of his short lasting glory ‘a nation of shopkeepers’, a similar cry nowadays made by the Brexit losers.
Britain's approaching referendum has led to rampant speculation about the economic and financial consequences of a vote to leave the European Union. And indeed, in the wake of a Brexit, uncertainty — the archenemy of economic growth and financial stability — would abound. But if Britain withdraws from the Continental bloc, its primary effect would be geopolitical, shaking the balance of power in Europe to its very foundation and forcing the bloc to rethink its role in the world.
The Franco-German alliance is the cornerstone on which European power dynamics rest. Conflict between the two drove three Continental wars between 1870 and 1945; its resolution facilitated peace after World War II, planting the seeds of eventual integration through the European Union. But France and Germany are not the only countries shaping Europe's course. A third actor plays the role of power broker between the two, stabilizing their relationship and, by extension, the Continent: the United Kingdom.
When France and West Germany founded the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Union's predecessor, in the 1950s, they had two goals. The first was to create a political and economic structure that would bind the two states together, reducing the chances of another war breaking out in Europe. The second was to facilitate trade and investment to rejuvenate Europe's war-weary economies. Both were pleased with the solution they found: France felt it had neutralized its eastern neighbor while maintaining control of Continental politics, and Germany had successfully reconciled with the West.
Meanwhile, the United Kingdom's relationship with the European project was somewhat ambiguous. As an island nation, Britain historically had been shielded from events unfolding on the mainland. If the United Kingdom intervened in Continental affairs, it was usually to ensure that power remained balanced and yet dispersed enough to keep Britain safe. When the EEC was born, London initially reacted with skepticism, wary of any project that would transfer more sovereignty from the British Parliament to unelected technocrats in Brussels. France, moreover, was eager to keep Britain out of the bloc; it was concerned about granting EEC membership to a country Charles de Gaulle described as "an American Trojan Horse in Europe." De Gaulle was also reluctant to include the only country in Western Europe capable of competing with France for leadership of the bloc. It came as no surprise when, in the 1960s, France vetoed Britain's membership twice.
But in the early 1970s, things changed. De Gaulle was no longer France's president, and both Paris and Berlin were quickly realizing the geopolitical importance of expanding the EEC's membership. Across the English Channel, London had lost its empire and was in the midst of reassessing its international priorities and trade relationships. Though it saw EEC membership as an opportunity to influence the process of Continental integration, Britain's interest in accessing the common market far outweighed its aspirations of building a federal Europe. Unlike France and Germany, Britain had little enthusiasm for transforming the Continent into a United States of Europe.
These motives formed the basis of Britain's modern relationship with Europe, which was largely established during the administration of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Under the Tory leader, Britain simultaneously pushed to lower its contribution to the EEC budget and eliminate trade barriers inside the bloc. In Thatcher's now-famous Bruges Speech, she dismissed the notion of a federal Europe, instead describing the Continental organization as an agreement among sovereign states to establish free trade. A few years later her successor, John Major, negotiated Britain's opt-out from the eurozone.
Thatcher also advocated enlarging the EEC to the east, a strategy Labour Party Prime Minister Tony Blair continued in the early 2000s. Bringing the former communist states under the Continental umbrella not only sped up their transition to market economies but also created new demand for British exports. As an added perk for London, the bloc's expansion into a larger and more loosely connected entity helped to dilute France and Germany's hold over Europe.
But Britain's approach has produced only mixed results. Few new EU members have joined the eurozone, showing the limits of the federal union, and many share Thatcher's view of the bloc as a pact among sovereign states. At the same time, the admission of countries such as Poland and Romania has led to a significant increase in immigration to the United Kingdom, a development that Brexit supporters consider a primary reason for leaving the bloc.
Upsetting the Balance of Power
If Britain quits the European Union, though, it risks disrupting the base of power the bloc has come to rest on. Germany relies on Britain's backing when it comes to promoting free trade in the face of France's protectionist tendencies. France sees Britain as not only a key defense partner but also a potential counterweight to German influence. Removing Britain from the equation would shatter this tenuous arrangement at a particularly dangerous time for the deeply fragmented Europe, when neither Germany nor France is satisfied with the status quo.
Should the "leave" camp win the British referendum, tension would rise between the Continent's north and south. Countries in Southern Europe want to turn the European Union into a transfer union that redistributes wealth from the relatively rich north to the less developed south and shares risk equally among members. Northern Europe, by comparison, is eager to protect its affluence and would agree to share risk only if the bloc assumed greater control over the south's ability to borrow and spend. The regions also disagree on how the European Union should use its funds. Southern Europe advocates generous subsidies for agriculture and development, a view most Eastern European states share, but Northern Europe would prefer to freeze or even reduce the bloc's budget.
As a net contributor to the European Union's budget, Britain has been particularly vocal on these issues. According to VoteWatch Europe, the country was on the losing side of votes related to EU spending more often than any other member between 2009 and 2015. Generally speaking, Northern European states such as Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark tend to vote alongside Britain. Germany also usually sees see eye to eye with Britain on certain topics, such as Europe's common market, though the two tend to disagree on issues like the environment. But regardless of other members' stances, Britain has proved more willing than any of its peers to openly voice opposition to EU decisions. Without it, the European Union would be short a liberalizing and market-friendly member, and the bloc's political balance would shift in the favor of protectionist countries in Southern Europe such as France, Italy and Spain.
As fears of a takeover by this Mediterranean group grow among Northern European governments, they would probably become more resistant to the process of Continental integration. After all, the European Union is already deeply divided over related issues such as the eurozone and Schengen Agreement, which have little to do with Britain since it is not a member of either. The looming referendum has only revealed more points of contention within the bloc that would be aggravated by a Brexit. The Dutch government, for example, recently argued for limiting membership in the Schengen zone to a handful of countries in Northern Europe, while the right-wing Alternative for Germany party proposed the creation of a "northern eurozone."
The north-south divide would not be the only gulf to widen on the Continent, either. Should Britain leave, the European Union would split between east and west, too. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe see Britain as the defender of non-eurozone members' interests, and many share London's views on the sovereignty of member states. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, for instance, are generally supportive of the European Union but suspicious of Brussels' attempts to interfere with their domestic affairs. In particular, these countries have sympathized with British Prime Minister David Cameron's campaign to give national parliaments more power to block EU legislation. Poland and the Baltic states also see Britain as a critical partner on the issue of Russia, since London has fought for a tough European stance against Moscow in response to its annexation of Crimea. In the event that Britain leaves the Continental bloc, its Central and Eastern European allies may eventually become more isolated from Brussels.
Weakening Europe's Influence Abroad
The loss of one of the few EU members that is able to operate on a global scale would undermine the bloc's external strength as well. Only France can match the international presence Britain has, thanks to London's vast political and economic connections and its considerable military prowess. Though a Brexit would not keep Britain from cooperating with Europe completely, given its continued NATO membership and shared security interests with France and Germany, its collaboration with the Continent would be limited. As a result, Europe's ability to cope with challenges abroad — whether the migrant crisis, international terrorism or a more assertive Russia — would diminish.
Germany's and France's recent calls for the European Union to deepen its military and security cooperation seem to suggest the two are concerned about this very outcome. Berlin has steadfastly avoided taking on the more active role in world affairs that a Brexit would require. Since the start of the European financial crisis, Germany has reluctantly shouldered the burden of leading the bloc's political and economic policymaking, but assuming a prominent military role is another matter. France, for one, would accept it only within the framework of an EU-wide military union, something that would be difficult to achieve amid the atmosphere of isolationism that has settled over the Continent. The political calculations of French and German leaders preparing for general elections in 2017 would make such cooperation even harder to come by.
No matter what British voters choose, the damage to Europe has already been done. If Britain leaves the European Union, it would throw the Continent into yet another political and economic crisis, giving Euroskeptic forces greater ammunition against the bloc and voters fewer reasons to defend it. But if Britain keeps its membership, it would have proved to other European governments that it is possible to demand concessions from Brussels while winning support at home. And so, regardless of what happens June 23, Britain has set a precedent that Brussels cannot stop other EU members from following.
Who Will Secure Lithuania?
May 15, 2016
The term “security” is a very multifaceted one, but today’s geopolitical situation forces us to think about its military aspects above all.
Our attention is completely absorbed by news of wars, conflicts, military exercises and the state of a country’s defence capabilities. An average European reader has no chance to skip this kind of news while looking through news feeds of popular media.
The further militarization of the European region and Russia pose the real threat today. A whole generation of European children is growing up in the firm belief that a war is approaching. We destroy ourselves by our fears. We notice everything concerning military issues and neglect economic and social sides of our life. We live in a changed world and we are to blame for it.
Let’s take Lithuania as an example. This small country with its long history and immensely kind and open people has fallen into the center of world attention over the past few weeks, mainly in connection with military affairs: rotational US troops arrival, participating in NATO drills, a United States F-22 Raptor stealth aircraft landing in Lithuania at Šiauliai Airbase, and so on and so forth.
One can conclude that the only serious problem of Lithuania’ s security is its weak national defence capabilities. This opinion is purposely formed by the national media and international journalists. Moreover, the government actively supports the shaping of such public views by giving interviews and showing off military vehicles, aircraft, and equipment.
Few people think about the purposes of such a PR campaign. This one-sided approach to the security of the state raises questions. Attracting attention to the military aspect of security will not help the authorities to secure the country. Hungry and angry people may become a force that can turn everything upside down. There are a lot of problems concerning Lithuania’s security in energy, economic, and demographic spheres today that are not the priorities for the government. Unfortunately, during the pre-election period, the authorities do their best to divert the attention of people from social problems to more “global” ones. They successfully exploit the Motherland’s defenders image instead of reporting on the domestic policy where they did not succeed.
The failures in domestic policy are more than obvious. According to the statistics, Lithuania today is one of the poorest nations in the EU. There is a catastrophic situation in the field of education. Low Lithuanian teachers’ salaries is driving threats to strike. The situation in Lithuanian retail centers, where a liter of milk costs less than a liter of water, is absolutely absurd! The minimum wage in Lithuania is only 350 euro per month. That is the lowest level among the Baltic States, and it’s no surprise that Lithuanian trade unions are staging protest actions to demand better working conditions.
According to statistics, the youth unemployment rate in Lithuania in March was 14.10 percent. Young people continue to leave Lithuania in search of a better life.
At the same time, the government is ready to welcome about 1000 NATO troops. On one hand there is nothing bad in additional military aid. On the other, the country doesn’t have spare money for accommodating foreign soldiers. Such steps pose a serious financial burden on a host nation. Can citizens really afford maintaining a foreign army when they can’t cover their own living expenses?
The deterioration of living conditions is particularly evident among ordinary citizens. Public revolt against food price increase in Lithuania in the last few days is an indicator of growing dissatisfaction with the domestic policy of the Lithuanian authorities who, as if nothing has happened, take no notice of the social “thunderstorm” approaching. It may so happen that a “social explosion” will occur earlier than the expected Russia’s attack. Lithuanians need not only a feeling of military security, but confidence in their future food and demographic security. They should trust government and be sure that the authorities have their best interests in mind. Only in this case will Lithuanians be active during election campaigns and respect their parliament and leaders. It is still unclear who will secure Lithuania, but it’s obviously not the people who are obliged to do it.
Nuclear Weapons in Lithuania: Defense against Russia or Target for Terrorists?
April 12, 2016
A complex geopolitical situation is forcing the Baltic States and their NATO allies to take unprecedented steps to increase defense capabilities and counter potential aggressors. A new Lithuanian military strategy approved in March describes Russian actions along with terrorism as the main threats for the security of Lithuania, as reported by Delfi.
Unfortunately for the pacifists, the Alliance and Russia today are arming and demonstrating their respective military power. They constantly compare their armed forces’ strength and capabilities, conduct large-scale military exercises, respond to each other by deploying new contingents and military equipment closer and closer to the NATO-Russian border.
The Baltic States have become such a border.
Moscow has placed Iskander-M launchers in Kaliningrad. The Russian Iskander is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead and has never been made available to any foreign army for operational use. The weapon affords Russia the ability to use its Baltic enclave to threaten US missile defense installations in Poland and more generally to intimidate its neighbors – the Baltic States.
During combat operations, it would be used to destroy both stationary and moving targets. Targets would range from surface-to-air missile batteries, enemy short-range missiles, airfields, ports, command and communication centers, factories, and other hardened targets.
The commander of US military aviation in Europe and Africa, General Frank Gorenc, said the increasingly powerful Russian air defense raises serious concerns for US military aviation.
He said that the Pentagon is particularly concerned about the Russian air defense system in the Kaliningrad region, a Russian enclave which borders Lithuania and Poland: “Russia now creates the strategy of limiting / blocking access. I do not remember anything else that would bother me as much as this strategy now and it worries me. Russian air defense in the Kaliningrad area increasingly threatens NATO military access to air space in parts Europe.”
The most logical response to this Moscow activity would be deploying nuclear warheads close to Russia’s borders. It has been well-known for decades that the United States still stores nuclear weapons in Europe. The existence of the bombs is officially neither confirmed nor denied. According to The Trumpet, more than 180 American-owned nuclear bombs are stored in the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Turkey and Belgium. Hypothetically, if a country has nuclear weapons it can deter Russia. The Baltic States do not possess such weapons, but there are some indicators that they are ready to deploy or to be host nations for aircraft equipped to carry nuclear weapons. By the way, just such aircraft were engaged an air policing mission in the Baltics.
NATO has been paying close attention to the modernization airbases in the Baltics. These sites have already been expanded and modernized according to NATO standards. In addition, the United States plans to spend $3 million (EUR 2.65 million) in 2017 on building a munitions storage area at the Air Base in Siauliai, northern Lithuania, according to LETA/BNS. Does it mean that this particular airbase will be used as a storage facility for nuclear warheads? Probably not, but in this case the Baltic States will feel much safer than now.
But there is the other side of the coin. If nuclear warheads were to be deployed on the territory of the Baltic States, they would automatically turn into an attractive target for terrorists.
Inside the halls of NATO, the future of nuclear weapons is a simmering political issue. Some of the nuclear faithful and their new Eastern European allies argue that readiness should be beefed up, and that nuclear weapons should be used more for “signaling” against a militaristic Russia. At the NATO Summit coming up in Warsaw in July, the possibility of a new “strategic concept” involving nuclear weapons is rumored to be on the agenda. But the Baltic States themselves should decide if they want to counter Russia successfully with nuclear weapons, but do so at the cost of simultaneously becoming a terrorist target.
The March 22 terrorist attacks in Brussels come as the European Union is still reeling from the November Paris attacks and scrambling to solve the migrant crisis. More important, they come as nationalist forces are challenging key principles of the Continental bloc, including the free movement of labor and the Schengen Agreement, which eliminated border controls among several member states. The atmosphere of fear and suspicion that is sure to follow will only worsen these social, political and economic crises.The first outcome of the Brussels attacks will be a fresh round of debate over EU border controls, in particular those in the Schengen zone. The Schengen Agreement came under fire at the start of the migrant crisis in early 2015. The Paris attacks escalated the controversy, particularly because the perpetrators moved between France and Belgium without detection. Consequently, France and other countries enhanced their border controls. The European Commission has since said that it wants all border controls in the Schengen area lifted by the end of 2016. However, the latest attacks — and the potential that more will follow — will make this difficult.Several governments in Western Europe will likely soon announce new national security legislation, improved controls on fighters returning from conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as enhanced intelligence sharing with their neighbors. EU members will also resume discussions on how best to combat terrorism abroad in troubled nations such as Libya and Syria. Europeans will become more willing to contribute to the coalition against the Islamic State, possibly with more weapons and training for the Iraqi military and Kurdish militants, increased deployment of combat aircraft and participation in NATO surveillance missions in Turkey.Another casualty could be the recent, tenuous agreement between Turkey and the European Union to limit the arrival of asylum seekers in Europe. Renewed awareness of the threat of terrorism among EU member states will bring focus on the bloc's external borders, possibly justifying deeper cooperation with Turkey. But the attacks could also reignite anti-Muslim sentiments in Europe and increase popular demands on EU governments not to grant visa-free travel to Turkish citizens — a key stipulation from Ankara for cooperation on migrant issues.Anti-Muslim sentiment could also lead to more support for nationalist parties across the Continent. France's National Front already receives substantial support in electoral polls. In Germany, the anti-immigration Alternative for Germany party recently achieved record performances in regional elections and is currently the country's third most popular party. Both France and Germany will hold general elections in 2017, in votes that will happen against the backdrop of the immigration crisis and the multiple terrorist attacks. In both cases, the mainstream parties will be under electoral pressure from their nationalist rivals. As a result, they will likely adopt some elements of nationalist party platforms. The same can be expected in other Northern European countries such as the Netherlands or Sweden, which also have relatively strong nationalist movements. Political parties and groups that want the United Kingdom to leave the European Union could also use the recent terrorist attacks to justify greater isolation from the Continent.Lastly, the Brussels attacks will hurt European economies, though likely only for a short time. In the coming days, some people in Belgium and other Western European countries may decide to avoid travel or densely crowded areas, such as cafes and shopping malls, out of fear of another attack. It will temporarily stifle domestic consumption and the tourism sector. For most Europeans, the threat of terrorism is by now a part of their daily lives. Beyond national politics and economics, the long-term impacts of the attacks will affect the very fabric of the European Union.
It's Time for Washington to Get Serious about Defending Europe
February 23, 2016Daniel Urchick The United States has nearly as many combat capable forces deployed in all of Europe today as it did in Germany’s Fulda Gap during the Cold War. Yet the continent is no longer at peace. Our defense policies in Europe have become outdated and weak. As the alliance moved east, NATO forces remained waiting in the Fulda Gap. These policies have left the stage open for a revisionist-minded Russia to toss aside the current international framework. Russia has tested NATO from Estonia to Turkey with no credible military deterrent opposing it.The United States needs to reassert its military leadership role in Europe. It needs to counter Russia’s provocations through bold actions to restructure its military posture. NATO should re-deploy from its current German-Italian defensive line to a modern Poland-Romania line. The forces deployed should be credible and highly capable of operating in a conventional warfare environment.There is no better way to deter further Russian aggression in Europe than through the deployment of military forces. Actions speak louder than words. Russia has carried out its provocations during a time of perceived weakness and distraction by the United States. By sending its troops, the United States can send an unmistakable signal to Russia about its strength and commitment to its allies. Nations from Estonia to Bulgaria will breathe a sigh of relief. They will then be able to better focus on developing stronger governance and economies – and building the means to provide more for their own defense.Since the end of the Cold War, NATO members have relied heavily on the United States for security. Nearly all fall short of meeting their 2% of GDP defense spending requirement. Now that Russia is once again a threat, those spending habits need to change. The United States should condition its re-deployment to the region on NATO members meeting their defense spending requirements. Such a step will reduce the United States’ security burden in the long run as well as improve NATO’s security.Current NATO efforts have deployed 500 to 1,000 men to each Eastern European member country. These men are supposed to serve as the trigger to a larger and more forceful response by NATO should harm befall them. They are, in essence, a speed bump. These units lack real fighting capacity against a determined Russian aggression or a strong Russian-backed movement. NATO forces moving from Germany to respond to Russia will face extended supply lines and a Russian force already dug in on occupied ground. By deploying a fighting force with legitimate punching power and with shorter supply lines, the United States will actually create an effective deterrent that protects all of NATO, not just its members in the west.The deployment of forces to Eastern Europe will be a costly endeavor as critics will be quick to point out. However, failing to protect the security of Europe will result in costs yet unimaginable. The increased cost of re-deploying forces in Europe is also now offset by the United States force reduction in Afghanistan. Unlike the Cold War, a substantial geographical buffer will remain between re-deployed NATO and a majority of Russia’s forces, reducing the fears of an accidental confrontation. If NATO and the Warsaw Pact could communicate in 1975, then NATO and Russia can much more easily communicate military concerns today.Bold action is needed when facing a bold adversary. Russian President Vladimir Putin seeks to establish an alternative framework to Western political, economic, and security norms. Weak U.S. defense policy in Europe has allowed for these machinations to manifest into provocative actions. By re-deploying a credible military deterrent to a Poland-Romania security line, the United States can help ensure the security of the continent for decades to come.
February 2016
Blame Belgium! How France Ignores Its Homegrown Terror Problem Three months after the November 13 terror attacks in Paris that took 130 lives, the world’s media appears to be more convinced than ever that the root of the evil that struck the French capital on that day is to be located some 300 kilometers to the north in the Belgian capital of Brussels. The idea that the Paris attacks were a “Belgian” operation has indeed become so ubiquitous and ingrained that Belgian authorities have felt compelled to mount a campaign to defend the country’s reputation and the mother of one of the victims who died at Paris’s Bataclan theater has even threatened to file suit against Belgium.
November 2015 Brussels
The family homes of the suspected mastermind of the Paris attacks and one of the suicide bombers stand only a few blocks apart in the Belgian capital's Molenbeek neighborhood. After a string of attacks in recent years linked to its grimy streets in central Brussels, a key question arises: Why Belgium? The tiny nation renowned for beer, chocolates and the comic book hero Tintin is now suddenly infamous for Islamic extremism — and the easy availability of illegal weapons. Belgium has a central location in Europe; few border controls; a common language with prime jihadist target France; and a political divide between French and Dutch speakers that has long created bureaucratic disarray in justice and security. From the prime minister down, there is widespread acknowledgment of a complicated and disjointed national structure that hampers the fight against extremism. "We have to do more and we have to do better," Prime Minister Charles Michel told legislators on Thursday, as he announced a slew of fresh measures to fight Islamic extremism. For years, there have been calls for more funds to boost the ranks of judges and police, but progress has been slow as rival political camps bickered and austerity measures set in. Meanwhile, the splintering of municipal authority in Brussels and judicial authority nationwide means there's little sense of who's in charge of what in security matters. Add to that a system in which policemen are often blocked from crossing borders — lacking jurisdiction to work in neighboring countries — while criminals can take advantage of Europe's open border policy, and it becomes clear why Belgium is attractive for terrorists. "They do shop around for locations where it's easier to be unnoticed, or that your opponents will lose your trail," said Edwin Bakker, director of the Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism at Leiden University. Abdelhamid Abaaoud, a Belgian who was the presumed organizer of the attacks, was killed in a raid Wednesday outside of Paris. Belgium and France are still on a manhunt for Frenchman Salah Abdeslam, a longtime Brussels resident. Both men grew up in the hardscrabble Molenbeek district, and their family homes stand within a short walk of its main police station. Abdeslam's brother, Brahim, blew himself up in a suicide attack, while another Brussels resident, Bilal Hafdi, also died in a suicide bombing. Perched over Brussels stands the massive Palace of Justice, once a shining monument to democratic values, now cloaked for decades in scaffolding so decrepit it has come to symbolize Belgium's neglect for law and order. From there, one can look out onto the Midi, a grimy neighborhood that has become a treasure trove for any criminal looking for illegal arms. Until 2006, Belgium had a very permissive gun law by European standards, and many weapons used in the 1990s Balkan wars easily found their way into the Belgian criminal underworld. At the same time, the Justice Ministry was hurt by austerity measures, rendering it powerless to dig into the root causes of the problem. "It is relatively easy to get your hands on heavy arms in Brussels," said Brice De Ruyver, a professor of criminology at Ghent University, who was security adviser to the prime minister from 2000 to 2008. "That applies to terror and serious crime. That is because the illegal arms trade has been neglected far too long. ... And once you have a reputation, it is tough to get rid of it." Molenbeek is separated from Midi by part of a mosaic of jurisdictions of 19 municipalities and 6 policing zones — all for a population of 1 million — which has long hampered cooperation. In comparison, New York, with five boroughs for 8.4 million people, has one police force. Often municipalities were socialist or liberal fiefdoms with little interest in being swallowed up by a centralized Brussels administration. The number of police zones has been reduced from 19, but the current six is still considered an anachronism given the need to unify forces in combating extremism. "Talent and manpower are badly spread out over the zone," said De Ruyver. "It is not where we need it most, namely in Molenbeek." Extremist ideology has also been allowed to thrive due to police neglect. For years, the leader of Islamic radical group Sharia4Belgium directed one of Europe's more potent recruitment machines for fighters in Syria. Yet it was only this year that he was sentenced to 12 years in prison as the leader of what a court determined was a terror group. "Sharia4Belgium has been able to act with impunity for too long," said De Ruyver. Prime Minister Michel has promised to crack down on radical mosque financing and clandestine places of worship, which have thrived largely because of Belgium's failures in integrating its 650,000-strong Muslim population. "There is a part of the population that lives in the margins, that doesn't look to have contact," said Molenbeek mayor Francoise Schepmans. "We let it happen." Many of the weaknesses have been linked to Belgium's complicated linguistic divide. Belgium's 6.5 million Dutch speakers in northern Flanders and the 4.5 million Francophones in southern Wallonia enjoy considerable political autonomy — seen as a way to help keep the country together. However, political appeasement between the groups has often trumped efficiency in decision-making. "It's a nightmare," Bakker said of the language barriers within law-and-order institutions.
november 2015 Paris France
On the night of Nov. 13, a handful of terrorists unleashed a barrage of coordinated attacks at public gathering spots in Paris. As the casualty figures climbed and investigators swung into action, news reports were filled with grim comparisons – some calling it the “worst night of violence in France since World War II” and others saying it could be Europe’s most horrific terrorist attack in history.Cutting past any hysteria or hyperbole, it is clear that the Nov. 13 attacks have brought to a head the conversation on a number of difficult, overlapping questions facing both Europe and the Middle East, including:How might European states shift their stance toward the influx of migrants and refugees coming from war zones in the Middle East?Are the capabilities of the Islamic State truly expanding, as recent claims suggest? What are its actual strengths and weaknesses?What options does Paris have in responding to the Nov. 13 attacks? As France steps up the tempo of airstrikes in Syria, will the Vienna talks on Syria’s conflict be radically reshaped?What does the future hold for the Schengen Agreement – and would its unraveling lead the European Union itself closer to dissolution?While investigators are busy piecing the story of “what happened” together and the mainstream media report their publicly announced findings, Stratfor is forecasting what’s likely to happen next.Our analyst team brings together a cross-cultural mix of tactical security, political, economic and military experts who look at the “big picture” from all angles – including open-source and human-sourced intelligence – to produce consensus-based forecasts.
While the Islamic State has claimed credit for the attack, it is still uncertain to what degree the Islamic State core organization was responsible for planning, funding or directing it. It is not clear whether the attackers were grassroots operatives encouraged by the organization, like Paris Kosher Deli gunman Ahmed Coulibaly, if the operatives were professional terrorist cadres dispatched by the core group, or if the attack was some combination of the two.
French President Francois Hollande publicly placed responsibility for the Nov. 13 attack on the Islamic State, declaring it an act of war. This French response to the Paris attacks is markedly different from that of the Spanish government following the March 2004 Madrid train bombings. Instead of pulling back from the global coalition working against jihadism, it appears that the French will renew and perhaps expand their efforts to pursue revenge for the most recent assault. The precise nature of this response will be determined by who is ultimately found to be the author of the Nov. 13 attack. ...
Thousands of migrants, seeking refuge from conflicts, oppression and poverty in many parts of the world, paying smugglers and often meeting a tragic end at sea.Refugee crises have emerged in places as far-flung as Southeast Asia – where Myanmar’s minority Rohingya Muslims are seeking better fortunes abroad – and in the Mediterranean Sea. In fact, some groups say that the world is now in the midst of the worst refugee crisis to emerge since the end of World War II.The waves of migrants who have been displaced by conflicts in the Middle East, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa pose a particularly difficult challenge for the European Union – where political bonds have been frayed by the ongoing economic crisis.