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January 2014 Ukraina
Ukraine

Ukraine Crisis: A New Peace Plan for Donbas

September 23, 2016

Sergei Souglobine

 

Summary

The last few days have seen renewed and arguably the most significant attempts to speed up the peace process in Ukraine than anytime earlier this year.  Germany and France have come up with essentially a new peace plan, which if implemented in full should make a difference.  On the table is their proposed tactic of small steps, which aims to reach a settlement in several stages and through reciprocal moves forward rather than by waiting for a full-scope implementation of the ceasefire agreement, as has been the case to-date.

Apparently, the international mediators have lost patience over the lack of progress reached so far to resolve the conflict that has been ongoing in the east of the country for over two years now, between the central Ukrainian authorities and Russia-backed separatists from the self-declared “republics.”  This conflict remains effectively frozen, with little sign of readiness to compromise from both sides – each of which sticks to its entrenched positions.  There are no longer large-scale military clashes, but the front-wide ceasefire, concluded in February 2015 as part of the Minsk II deal, has been regularly – albeit with a varied intensity – violated.

However, the new plan is hinged on many “ifs,” the primary one being a standpoint taken by Ukraine.  It looks as though the latest German-French initiative to move forward in parallel on both political and security issues is running counter to Kyiv’s prolonged insistence that security should come first.  This insistence has allowed the Ukrainian side to avoid making concessions on such sensitive issues as local elections in Donbas and a special autonomy status for the rebel territories, something Russia has been demanding all along.  As a result, more than ever before Kyiv is now under pressure to agree to what it considers to be Russia-favoured terms.  Such terms could prove unacceptable to the current Ukrainian authorities.

Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich is expected to sign some agreements that could eventually integrate Ukraine with the European Union economically. Ultimately, Yanukovich refused to sign the agreements, a decision thousands of people protested. The demonstrations later evolved, as they often do. Protesters started calling for political change, and when Yanukovich resisted their calls, they demanded new elections.  Some protesters wanted Ukraine to have a European orientation rather than a Russian one. Others felt that the government was corrupt and should thus be replaced. These kinds of demonstrations occur in many countries. Sometimes they're successful; sometimes they're not. In most cases, the outcome matters only to the country's citizens or to the citizens of neighboring states. But Ukraine is exceptional because it is enormously important. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has had to pursue a delicate balance between the tenuous promises of a liberal, wealthy and somewhat aloof Europe and the fact that its very existence and independence can be a source of strategic vulnerability for Russia.

The United States is, at the moment, off balance. It faces challenges in the Syria-Iraq theater as well as challenges in Ukraine. It does not have a clear response to either. It does not know what success in either theater would look like, what resources it is prepared to devote to either, nor whether the consequences of defeat would be manageable.

A dilemma of this sort is not unusual for a global power. Its very breadth of interests and the extent of power create opportunities for unexpected events, and these events, particularly simultaneous challenges in different areas, create uncertainty and confusion. U.S. geography and power permit a degree of uncertainty without leading to disaster, but generating a coherent and integrated strategy is necessary, even if that strategy is simply to walk away and let events run their course. I am not suggesting the latter strategy but arguing that at a certain point, confusion must run its course and clear intentions must emerge. When they do, the result will be the coherence of a new strategic map that encompasses both conflicts.

 The most critical issue for the United States is to create a single integrated plan that takes into account the most pressing challenges. Such a plan must begin by defining a theater of operations sufficiently coherent geographically as to permit integrated political maneuvering and military planning. U.S. military doctrine has moved explicitly away from a two-war strategy. Operationally, it might not be possible to engage all adversaries simultaneously, but conceptually, it is essential to think in terms of a coherent center of gravity of operations. For me, it is increasingly clear that that center is the Black Sea.

Ukraine, Iraq and a Black Sea Strategy

Ukraine - analysis

 

The name "Ukraine" literally translates as "on the edge." It is a country on the edge of other countries, sometimes part of one, sometimes part of another and more frequently divided. In the 17th and 18th centuries, it was divided between Russia, Poland and the Ottoman Empire. In the 19th century, it was divided between Russia and Austria-Hungary. And in the 20th century, save for a short period of independence after World War I, it became part of the Soviet Union. Ukraine has been on the edge of empires for centuries.

Europe after plane crash

 Is it Normal?

  Russia and Ukraine continue to confront each other along their border. Iraq has splintered, leading to unabated internal warfare. And the situation in Gaza remains dire. These events should be enough to constitute the sum total of our global crises, but they're not. On top of everything, the German economy contracted by 0.2 percent last quarter. Though many will dismiss this contraction outright, the fact that the world's fourth-largest economy (and Europe's largest) has shrunk, even by this small amount, is a matter of global significance.Europe has been mired in an economic crisis for half a decade now. Germany is the economic engine of Europe, and it is expected that it will at some point pull Europe out of its crisis. There have been constant predictions that Europe may finally be turning an economic corner, but if Germany's economy is contracting (Berlin claims it will rebound this year), it is difficult to believe that any corner is being turned. It is becoming increasingly reasonable to believe that rather than an interlude in European prosperity, what we now see is actually the new normal. The key point is not that Germany's economy has contracted by a trivial amount. The point is that it has come time to raise the possibility that it could be a very long time before Europe returns to its pre-2008 prosperity and to consider what this means.

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