The Empire Strikes Back at Trump’s White House

February 21, 2017

Tomislav Jakić

 

When Donald John Trump took over as president of the United States a month ago, there were – not many though – reasonable, cold analysts who, based on his pre-election statements, predicted that a man who is going to wage war against the establishment (the empire) is entering a conflict with a very uncertain result. Some of them even did not hesitate to say that Trump is bound to lose this battle. Judging by what is happening now, those who spoke about a war with uncertain results were completely right, and those who predicted Trump’s defeat might be right. We will see in the not-so-distant future.

Trump’s throne – if one can say so – was seriously shaken the moment one of his closest associates, national security advisor general Michael Flynn, was forced to resign. And, let us not be misguided, not because he was “insincere” with Vice President Pence, but because he dared to contact (how horrific!) the ambassador of Russia before the elections and – allegedly – spoke with him about the possibility of abandoning sanctions against his country. And when, immediately after that, a White House spokesman said that Russia is expected to return the Crimea peninsula to Ukraine, there was no doubt whatsoever whether Trump would be able to fulfill what he promised in the election campaign. With those promises, the key ones, he managed – despite his lack of political experience, despite his sexism, and despite his entertainment past – to arouse the hopes of all those in the world who were fed up with the American policy of interventionism and with its imposing of what has been “sold” for decades as democracy, with massive help from an enormous army and more than 700 military bases around the world. Just to remind you: Trump explicitly promised that America will stop imposing regimes, or as he put it in his inaugural address: ‘the American way of life.’ And, very important, he expressed his willingness to normalize relations with Russia, which were deteriorating rapidly and dangerously. General Flynn backed such a policy. And that is the reason why he had to go. His resignation is the first serious blow delivered by the system (establishment) against the new man in the White House. After getting rid of Flynn, influential circles not only in the Democratic party (including the Clinton clan), but in the Republican party too (which never really got to terms first with his nomination as presidential candidate and after that with him as the president), as well as those who are often described as the ‘invisible centers of influence,’ directing the politicians as actors on the stage – they all smelled blood. And this is not a conspiracy theory, this is something quite obvious to everybody who is willing to see, to hear, and to draw the only possible conclusions from what he (or she) saw or heard, without becoming the victim or the hostage of anybody’s propaganda, regardless of whose. Do not be mistaken: those who smelled blood will not stop.

And who is, after all, this general Michael Flynn? He is former chief of the US military intelligence, the most decorated high-ranking American officer in this position over the last two decades. From this position he was relieved when he dared to put into question the way the US intelligence community worked and its results (the very same intelligence community which spies for years now on whomever it wants, around the globe, including heads of states, American allies; this is, by the way a proven fact!). Did he speak with the Russian ambassador prior to the elections? Yes, he did. Did he, by doing so, violate an old act (the Logan Act) which forbids, to put it in the simplest terms, private persons to engage in diplomatic activities? Again: yes, he did. But, did anybody invoke this same act when some 8 or 9 years ago a certain Barack Obama, at that time just a presidential candidate (a private person too) travelled around the world meeting heads of states and governments? The answer is: no! Had Flynn have spoken with ambassadors of, let us say, Germany or France, nobody would have said a word. But he sinned, because he spoke with the Russian ambassador and Russia is, as everybody “knows,” an enemy of the West, an enemy of democracy, a power which is on the verge of sending its armed forces to conquer Europe (if one would believe the mainstream media, or for that matter, the Secretary-general of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg).

On the tracks of the anti-Russian hysteria, which becomes more and more present, Flynn was accused, without any evidence, that for him “Putin comes first and only then the US.” Demands are being made, imperatively, to investigate all links between the general and Russia. And all this only to be able to repeat the “old song” from the US election campaign: Russia’s role in the US presidential elections should be investigated (although this role was never proved by solid evidence, or what the Americans call a “smoking gun” – it was only talked about). And all of this to repeat that Trump is a puppet in Russian hands, backed now with the “expertise” of more than 30 “shrinks” who have concluded, on the basis of Trump’s behavior and his statements, that he is not fit to be the president of the U.S.

And again: the story will not stop here. The empire (establishment) strikes back and hits a man who thought, because he practically alone, against all odds, won the presidential elections, that he can change the system. It is more than likely that he cannot. The war hero, CIC of the Normandy invasion and later US president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, was clever (or wise) enough to mention the military-industrial complex and its dangerous role only at the end of his term in office. Trump, who cannot be compared with legendary Ike in any way, did practically the same thing in the first days of his mandate, challenging this system. And sealed, thus, his destiny – as it seems now. He will be, with the “logistic help” of the Europeans who are already describing him as somebody able to launch in the next two years “a cultural revolution” (allusion to communist China) either be chased out of the White House (under any pretext), or he will be forced to become a tool in the hands of others. After all, one should remember Obama and his big promises with which he won the Peace Nobel price (hand stretched to the Muslim countries, a world without nuclear weapons etc.) He did nothing of that sort, but continued the policy of his predecessors, becoming “famous” because of his bombings of a number of countries and destabilizing the Middle East, not to mention the direct and indirect support to those who are today known as Islamist terrorists. In short: he allowed himself to be “eaten” by the system. And this is the least that could happen to Trump.

Why did this “deconstruction” of Trump begin with General Flynn? The answer is simple: because the general backed the normalization of the relations with Russia, even more he backed the cooperation with Russia in the fight against global terrorism, which means stopping any support and help for the Islamists, who are still called by many in the West “opposition,” “armed opposition,” or “fighters against tyranny and for freedom.” The military-industrial complex lives from wars and it imposed on the West the confrontation with Russia, the policy of enlarging and strengthening of the NATO (which, being a genuine relict of the Cold War, was called “obsolete” by Trump), the policy which resulted in bringing to Europe hundreds of American tanks and thousands of troops.

To put it quite simply: without the confrontation with Russia, without the continuation of the policy of imposing regimes and taking control over energy sources and main energy routes, there is no money, there is no profit. This is the reason why those who evaluated the fall of socialism in Europe as their final victory, only to see how Putin is putting into question this victory (namely standing up against a unipolar world), after absorbing the shock of Trump’s victory and his announced foreign policy, decided to take things into their hands again. Thus we may expect strengthening of anti-Russian sentiments (allegations of Russian meddling in elections, though never proven, are being repeated again and again, now prior to the presidential elections in France). We may expect a changed rhetoric both from President Trump and from the White House. And we should stop hoping for the end of the renewed Cold War. This war means profit, and those who are making this profit are not prepared to let anybody else take it from them, or to stop them making it at all; despite the fact that it is a bloody profit, “earned” at the cost of hundreds of thousands of human lives. General Flynn had this experience. President Trump, from what can be concluded right now, still has to learn the lesson.

And the “rest of the world”? Well, those who survive will tell the story.

The North Korea Threat

February 13, 2017

Geopolitical Monitor

 

Summary

As Donald Trump’s newly victorious transition team descended on the White House, outgoing President Barack Obama had a stark warning for them: North Korea is the greatest threat facing the United States, and as such it should be the top security priority of the new administration

Solving the problem of North Korea won’t be easy. Previous governments have staked their credibility – and lost – on trying to induce Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons program in exchange for economic concessions. The military route is equally perilous. Even before Pyongyang developed nuclear weapons, its artillery deployments, short-range missile program, chemical weapon stocks, and close proximity to the South Korean capital made the notion of a pre-emptive strike a costly gamble.

Now the Trump administration takes over amidst maturing North Korean missile and nuclear programs. Will President Trump hammer out the solution that has eluded his predecessors, or will North Korea persist as the Gordian knot of East Asian security?

This backgrounder examines the North Korea threat and what the Trump administration can do about it.

US-Vietnam Rapprochement Fast-tracked amid South China Sea Dispute

May 18, 2016

Michael Hart

 

President Obama’s upcoming visit to Vietnam could amount to far more than just a symbolic political photo opportunity. It comes amid suggestions that the U.S. may be about to lift an arms embargo which has remained in place for four decades. If this were to happen, it would signal a historic shift in perspective and represent the most significant stride forward in diplomatic relations to date between these two former adversaries, more than 40 years after the end of the Vietnam War.

However it is not just time which has healed old wounds: this blossoming friendship has been rapidly propelled forward as a result of the unresolved territorial disputes in the South China Sea. China’s increasingly assertive actions, such as land-reclamation and drilling for oil in disputed waters, have heightened tensions with neighbouring Vietnam. These perceived attempts by China to expand its influence into the wider region have led to it being viewed as a common security threat by both Vietnam and the United States, resulting in a remarkable rapprochement between two historical enemies.

Whilst diplomatic relations were formally restored in 1995, it has taken a further 20 years for the U.S. and Vietnam to put their past differences aside and forge a closer alliance with the aim of balancing China’s rising power in the Asia-Pacific. The South China Sea is vitally important to both countries in strategic and economic terms; therefore China’s extended control is viewed as threat to national interests. From the Vietnamese perspective, maintaining control over its waters is crucial for maritime defence, whilst ensuring access to potential energy reserves is essential to meeting the future needs of its growing population and booming economy. From the U.S. perspective, there are concerns that China’s dominance could lessen US influence in the region and pose a threat to freedom of navigation in an area that is a hub for international trade. The South China Sea’s network of shipping lanes links the Indian and Pacific Oceans, forming a key lifeline for the regional economy and the global trade in natural resources. More than 41,000 ships and US$5.3 trillion in trade pass through each year, whilst the Sea is also estimated to contain up to 213 billion barrels of oil, making it a potentially vital source of energy for the burgeoning populations of South-East Asia.

China claims over 80% of the South China Sea as its territorial waters, and has pushed forward historical arguments to assert sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratly Islands. Several other countries adjacent to the Sea – Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, Brunei, Indonesia and the Philippines – have strongly contested these claims, resulting in a catalogue of maritime clashes. However, due to its geographical proximity and long history of animosity with its giant northern neighbour, it is Vietnam which has emerged as China’s primary maritime rival.

Despite widespread regional opposition, China has forged ahead with its island-building and land reclamation projects. Some have viewed this as an aggressive attempt by China to expand its authority, militarize the region, and take control of the sea’s resources. These recent activities have followed years of escalating tensions and serious incidents – the most dramatic of which occurred in May 2014 after China moved an oil rig in to waters claimed by Vietnam as its ‘Exclusive Economic Zone’ (EEZ). The dispute quickly evolved into a full-scale diplomatic incident: Vietnam sent 30 patrol boats to disrupt the operation, whilst rare anti-China street protests erupted in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. Additionally, there have been numerous reported incidents of Vietnamese fishing boats being harassed by the PLA Navy, along with accusations of China using its economic power to dissuade foreign oil companies, such as BP and ExxonMobil, from signing exploration contracts with Vietnam in disputed waters.

In light of its assertive territorial claims and displays of dominance in the South China Sea, China has increasingly been presented as a threat not only to Vietnam’s security and economic prosperity, but also to US military hegemony and influence in the Asia-Pacific. Therefore whilst maintaining a relationship of friendly co-operation with the Chinese government across many issue areas, it is becoming increasingly clear that Hanoi and Washington now both view China as a common threat in the South China Sea, resulting in a strong convergence of interests in the security field. The shared desire to balance China’s power in the region has led to the emergence of a once-unthinkable alliance between these two former enemies.

However, this rapprochement would not have been possible at all were it not for a profound shift in US foreign policy after the 2008 election of President Obama. His eight years in power have been characterized by an open-minded, outward-looking and future-oriented approach, creating an environment whereby the US has actively reached-out to establish improved ties with former rivals. This new outlook has paved the way for the normalization of ties with Cuba, along with vastly improved diplomatic relations with Iran – which resulted in last year’s nuclear deal followed by the lifting of long-standing economic sanctions. However the most remarkable turnaround in US foreign policy may yet be the renewed engagement with Vietnam.

Relations began their transformation following the visit of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Hanoi in July 2012; whilst in October 2014, the US eased some of the restrictions laid out in the decades-old arms embargo. If these initial breakthroughs were considered as largely symbolic, more significant progress took place the following year. In July 2015, the general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), Nguyen Phu Trong, made a landmark visit to Washington and signed an ‘Extensive Comprehensive Partnership’ between the two countries. The alliance may yet be strengthened further, with recent indications suggesting that the U.S. may decide to fully lift the arms embargo later this year. The likely aim would be to strengthen Vietnam’s maritime security capacity in order to balance China’s rapidly expanding naval capabilities.

An alliance which was previously considered impossible now seems to have become political reality, as the signing of the comprehensive partnership signifies a level of mutual trust which has not existed until recently, and which will surely be further enhanced by Obama’s visit. The United States appears to have calculated that the strategic gains of a stronger relationship with Vietnam will outweigh the risks of antagonizing China. The rhetoric of both nations’ leaders, whilst rarely mentioning China explicitly, makes it clear that maritime security is at the heart of their vastly improved relations. A joint statement released during Trong’s 2015 visit to Washington asserts that both countries are “concerned about recent developments in the South China Sea which have increased tensions, eroded trust and threatened to undermine peace, security, and stability” in the region, whilst rejecting “coercion, intimidation and the use of force” to settle disputes. This rhetoric has been backed up by strategic commitments in Washington: the US military has announced its intention to ‘pivot’ towards the Asia-Pacific, pledging to deploy 60% of its warships in the region by 2020. In the maritime arena, Vietnam is seen as a crucial long-term ally in US efforts to counter-balance China.

China shows little sign of backing down from its extensive territorial claims or from its expanding military activities in the South China Sea, leaving the region set to remain a site of intense geopolitical competition in the coming years. As a result, Vietnam’s rapprochement with the U.S. is likely to gain further momentum, and the full lifting of the longstanding arms embargo looks an increasingly likely prospect. Moreover, President Obama’s upcoming visit reaffirms Washington’s commitment to an alliance which could be crucial in balancing China’s power, and important in ensuring long-term stability in the increasingly tense geopolitical arena of the Asia-Pacific.

February 2016

Missiles Just the Latest Chapter in the South China Sea Saga With the recent placement of surface-­to-­air missiles (SAMs) on Woody Island, a subset of the Paracel Islands, China has taken a major step toward militarization of the South China Sea. The action was taken during the recent US-­ASEAN “Sunnylands” Summit, where economics, security, and international law were all discussed. In the context of recent and historical events however, the action, though not entirely justified, could not have come as a surprise to any of the parties involved and forms only the latest chapter in the ongoing book of the South China Sea.Seoul's spy service says North Korea is preparing attacks

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un recently ordered preparations for launching attacks on South Korea, the South's spy agency disclosed Thursday, as worries about the North grow after its recent nuclear test and rocket launch.

In a closed-door briefing to ruling Saenuri Party members, the National Intelligence Service said Kim's spy agency has begun work to implement his order to "actively muster capabilities" to carry out cyber and other attacks on South Korea, according to one Saenuri official who attended the meeting.

North Korea has a history of attacks on South Korea, such as the 2010 shelling on an island that killed four South Koreans and the 1987 bombing of a South Korean passenger plane that killed all 115 people on board. But it is impossible to independently confirm claims about any such attack preparations.

The Saenuri official refused to say whether the briefing discussed how the information was obtained. The NIS, which has a mixed record on predicting developments in North Korea, said it could not confirm its reported assessment.

During the briefing, the NIS, cited studies on past North Korean provocations and other unspecified assessments and said the attacks could target anti-Pyongyang activists, defectors and government officials in South Korea, the Saenuri official said requesting anonymity because he wasn't authorized to speak to media publicly.

Attacks on subways, shopping malls and other public places could also happen, he said.

The official quoted the NIS as saying North Korea could launch poisoning attacks on the activists and defectors, or lure them to China where they would be kidnapped.

The current North Korea standoff isn't expected to calm down soon, as Seoul and Washington are discussing deploying a sophisticated U.S. missile defense system in South Korea that Pyongyang warns would be a source of regional tension.

The allies also say their upcoming annual springtime military drills will be the largest ever. The North says the drills are preparation to stage a northward invasion.

Seoul defense officials also said that they began preliminary talks on Feb. 7 with the United States on deploying the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense, the same day North Korea conducted what it said was a satellite launch but is condemned by Seoul and Washington as a banned test of missile technology.

The talks are aimed at working out details for formal missile deployment talks, such as who'll represent each side, according to Seoul's Defense Ministry.

The deployment is opposed by China and Russia too. Opponents say the system could help U.S. radar spot missiles in other countries.

The United States on Wednesday flew four stealth F-22 fighter jets over South Korea and reaffirmed it maintains an "ironclad commitment" to the defense of its Asian ally. Last month, it sent a nuclear-capable B-52 bomber to South Korea following the North's fourth nuclear test.

Foreign analysts say the North's rocket launch and nuclear test put the country further along it its quest for a nuclear-armed missile that could reach the U.S. mainland.

 

JANUARY 2016

For US and Russia, All Roads Lead to China -

 

Recently I attended an event where the speaker referred to the interplay between economics and security in Asia as being that of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.  Dr. Jekyll represents the positive economic growth and interaction within the region, while Mr. Hyde represents the increasing security competition between the great powers of the area, namely Japan and China.

Asia, however, does not exist within a vacuum and China in particular has been used as a hedge by Russia whenever its relations with the West have been threatened.  Until fairly recently, the U.S. has historically used China as a spoiler to contain Soviet ambitions and nowadays would hope for improved U.S.-China ties contain a resurgent Russia.  Both Russia and the U.S. have traditionally fixated on China as a wedge to contain the other’s ambitions, with this resultant Cold War mentality still presently accounting for the failure of their respective economies to fully take advantage of integration opportunities within Asia.

Attention Deficit Disorder

With Russia’s turn towards China in the wake of negative Western sentiment and sanctions from its Ukraine and Syria maneuvers, it’s easy to forget that this is a transparent tactic Russia has used before to try to gain political leverage with the West.  Russian efforts to improve ties with China economically and politically go back at least thirty years to Gorbachev’s 1986 Vladivostok visit and 1989 Beijing visit respectively.  Efforts to integrate the Russian Far East (RFE) into the Asian economic dynamic were subordinated to politics yet again with Russia’s brief partnership with the U.S. in the wake of 9/11.  Only after it was apparent that Russia would not be treated as a genuine partner with its own security interests did it turn again towards the East in order to gain leverage.

For most of the early Cold War, the U.S. treated the Former Soviet Union and China as one cohesive monolith, despite the increasing Sino-Soviet schism.  It wasn’t until 1972 that the U.S. was able to successfully exploit this rift, leveraging improved Sino-U.S. ties as a mechanism to begin a series of detente talks with the USSR.  Improved economic relations with China served to undergird the U.S.’s larger strategic objectives with respect to its chief Cold War nemesis and were only considered by the U.S. as a means to an end.

Always a Bridesmaid, Never a Bride

As two large continental powers with a history of rapid territorial aggrandizement, “Gathering of the Russian Lands” vs. “Manifest Destiny,” Russia and the U.S. have always had a special sense of their own historic purposes with respect to the rest of the world.  The Cold War only amplified these tendencies and forced them to focus most of their political energies on one another.  The U.S. and Former Soviet Union had to be able to respond to its rival’s provocations around the world as their interests intersected globally.

During the Cold War, Japan, as head of the “Flying Geese” formation (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) emerged as the economic engine of Asia as access to the growing US consumer market allowed it to assume this position.  Post-Cold War, Japan was gradually eclipsed by China as the world’s factory and largest consumer market.  The 2008 Financial Crisis only accelerated this trend.  For the longest time, economic engagement with Asia, and China specifically, was only viewed tangentially and as one of many interests of both Russia and the U.S.

Chinese Finger Trap

China’s rise, especially after 2008, has ensured that this can no longer be the case.  China’s current economic troubles are not going to undo a generation’s worth of spectacular economic growth, trillions of dollars in foreign exchange reserves, the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).  Economics is the key pillar of power in the 21st century, Asia is the world’s financial foundation, and China is the economic heart of Asia.

Both Russia and the U.S. need to avoid their traditional tactics of trying to escape the Chinese Finger Trap.  No matter how much they may want to maintain the pretense of trying to counter one another globally in their New Cold War, they inevitably will be drawn back to Asia, and China specifically, because of its economic dominance in the world’s most important economic region.  Only by pushing their fingers towards one another through a long-term commitment to economically engage Asia, with a focus on China, will Russia and the U.S. be able to free themselves from the trap of Cold War obscurity.

 

Putin the Opportunist

October 5, 2015

There has been much speculation and concern about the goals of Russian President Vladimir Putin in Syria. Many commentators, including President Obama have said that Putin is making a serious mistake getting involved in the mess that is Syria. From the perspective of a Western politician that would certainly be true. But for an authoritarian country like Russia winning is measured differently.The first and most obvious benefit to the Russian intervention in Syria is to prop up the faltering Assad regime. Syria, a longtime client state of Russia and the Soviet Union is a valuable foothold for Russia in the Middle East. Russia is supporting Iranian development of a Shiite power arc that stretches from western Afghanistan to Lebanon through Iran, Iraq, and Syria.Keeping Assad in power is the preferred result for Russia. It is necessary to prevent either ISIS, a Turkish client state, a Sunni-led authoritarian state or a Western backed democracy from coming to power in Syria. Of these four options, an ISIS state would be the preferred outcome for Putin. But it would only be temporary because it would force the West to become much more involved in removing ISIS and installing one of the other options. Stability and nonalignment with Russia would eventually result in gas and oil pipelines from the Arabian Peninsula to Turkey and Europe. Undercutting the Russian efforts to control the European market. For Putin, Assad does not have to win, he just has to survive. Putin needs to prevent anyone aligned with the West from winning.As long as Russian forces are in Syria protecting Assad it makes it very difficult for others to attack Assad and his forces. As soon as the Russians started unloading troops and aircraft in Syria, the US was making contact with the Russians to discuss deconfliction of the battlefield. To prevent an incident between Russian and Allied aircraft, Russia will likely push for buffer zones around Assad’s forces that are being protected by the Russians. The Russians will agree to cooperation only in attacking ISIS and other rebel groups.In any kind of agreement the Russians will want detailed information about the non-ISIS rebel forces as well as the ISIS forces. There is already an intelligence sharing agreement between Russia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria for targeting ISIS. It most likely extends well beyond that. The Russians call all of the anti-Assad forces terrorists and consider them all legitimate targets. Putin does not respect the Western Allies enough to even blame a lack of cooperation for the attacks on Western-backed rebels. He thumbs his nose because he understands the moral weakness in the current Western leadership.The West is spending billions in Syria and Iraq without any signs of success. Russia and now China can spend far less to prevent a Western victory in the Middle East. While the Obama administration is not likely to change course and work for a victory, the next administration is likely to be far more assertive in achieving some type of success in Syria and Iraq. Regime change in Syria will have to be a part of that. With Russia and China providing protection for Assad, any efforts in Syria will have to be worked out with them. In addition to their veto in the UN they now have a veto on the ground. As long as the West cannot stabilize the Middle East they will not be able to shift more attention to Ukraine or East Asia. This will give Russia and China more space to maneuver in areas that are truly important to them.The other significant opportunity that has fallen into Putin’s lap is the refugee crisis in Europe. The world has witnessed the strain on European cohesion. The EU has already been under strain from many issues including; differences between the creditor and debtor nations, a sluggish economy, austerity measures, unemployment, separatism, sanctions on Russia, and numerous sovereignty issues.In the near future the pressure to do something about the refugee crisis at the source may have resulted in an operation to create safe areas and/or regime change in Syria. The Russian forces in Syria certainly complicates such a scenario if not making it impossible. They will most likely insist that any safe areas be under the authority of the Syrian government. Any attempts at regime change will run the risk of incidents between Allied and Russian forces.Two-thirds of the Syrian refugees are displaced internally. Putin can influence and facilitate their mass migration to Syria’s neighbors and then on to Europe to cause more disruption. Already Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon are under great strain from the large numbers of refugees on their territory. Pressuring the Sunni internally displaced persons to flee Syria will make the country’s demographics more favorable for the ruling Alawites. With another huge influx of refugees Syria’s neighbors may close their borders or facilitate the movement of refugees to other countries. Russian intelligence working through organized crime groups can use the flow of refugees to put pressure on the EU. This is another front in Putin’s war to fracture the EU and NATO for strategic advantage. By driving those internal refugees that are undesirable to the Syrian regime to Europe they can further destabilize the EU.Putin has already been quite successful in fomenting division in the EU. He has long manipulated CEOs and government officials with differential gas prices. Just last month he was able to get Germany to betray Ukraine and much of Eastern Europe with the Nord Stream Two agreement. There is division in the EU about sanctions against Russia. Many want to restore trade with Russia to help the EU economy. Russia and their European apologists are using Russian proposals to fight ISIS as another excuse to normalize relations with Russia.Putin has provided funding to fringe political parties on the left and the right throughout Europe. Many of these parties already have an anti-EU platform. The right-wing parties also tend to be anti-immigrant and nationalist. Putin can further aid these groups by flooding Europe with refugees, especially Muslim refugees. These parties are already using the refugee crisis to stir up a populist backlash against immigrants and the EU system. Even if these fringe parties do not come to power it puts pressure on the mainstream parties to adopt some of their positions.European countries have already closed some of their previously open borders. When several million more refugees show up on European shores the crisis will become much worse. Extreme left and right wing political parties have already been gaining support in Europe due to the economic stagnation and perceptions of loss of national sovereignty to the EU. Millions of Muslim refugees will only exasperate this problem. As public and political resistance to the immigrants builds the humanitarian situation of the refugees will worsen.In the midst of the refugees there are undoubtedly some Islamist radicals. They will use any humanitarian problems in Europe to help them radicalize more refugees to continue their war against infidels in Europe. The alienation that many of these immigrants will feel because of the increasingly unwelcoming reception they receive, especially among young men, will drive more into the arms of the Islamists. This will increase the terrorist threat, further destabilizing Europe.While Russia did not start the refugee crisis they may have found a way to exploit it to further their hybrid war against Europe. While the direct benefits of intervention in Syria are valuable to the anti-West coalition that Russia is forming, the far greater benefit could be a devastating flank attack on European unity.

Russia complains of 'strange hysteria' over its presence in Syria

Russia has sent tanks and artillery to Syria amid a reported military buildup, US officials say, raising concerns about a potential mission to bolster President Bashar al-Assad’s embattled regime.

Moscow has sent artillery units and seven tanks to the Syrian airbase near Latakia on the Mediterranean coast as part of an ongoing military buildup, a US official told AFP on Monday, speaking on condition of anonymity.

The source said the seven T-90s, Russia’s most modern service tank, arrived in Latakia in the past few days but had not been seen outside the airbase. The artillery was likely for airfield defence, the source said.

"Hundreds" of Russian troops are already present in Latakia, and Moscow has installed enough mobile housing units to house about 1,500 people, the source added.

Also on Monday, navy captain Jeff Davis, a Pentagon spokesman, said a "steady flow" of Russian personnel and military equipment to Latakia in recent days suggests Moscow plans to operate military aircraft from the base, AP reported. But the US has not yet seen any fighter jets or attack helicopters arrive, he said.

Although photographs and social media posts have shown Russian soldiers are in Syria, the Kremlin has maintained they are there as advisers. Russian military activity could conflict with the US-led coalition’s airstrikes against Islamic State (Isis), potentially tying up airspace, US officials have said.

Davis said Washington would welcome Moscow’s contributions to the effort against Isis, but that military assistance for Assad could "risk adding greater instability to an already unstable situation".

Russian officials have not commented on the alleged arrival of tanks and artillery. But the Syrian ambassador to Moscow, Riad Haddad, on Monday denied that Moscow was conducting a military buildup in Syria, calling news of a Russian troop presence "a lie". He said Syria was receiving arms from its ally under defence contracts, state news agency Tass reported.

How Turkey Would Invade Syria

 Turkish military trucks and soldiers near the Akcakale crossing gate between Turkey and Syria on June  

Summary

Numerous but unverified reports in the Turkish media say the Turkish military will soon intervene in Syria. Notably, high-level officials including Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu have not denied the claims, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has taken to Twitter to emphasize that the Turks will not allow terror organizations to take advantage of the chaotic environment along Turkey's borders. However, the operation discussed in the media, especially the possibility of a ground incursion, is unlikely. Still, it is worth highlighting the risks that will constrain Turkey in the off chance it decides to pursue such a course of action.

Analysis

Different scenarios have emerged amid the rumors of a Turkish invasion into Syria. Some reports suggest the military will deploy some 18,000 troops with substantial air support to secure a 30-kilometer (18-mile) deep territory across the border in Syria running from the city of Jarabulus westward to the areas occupied by the rebels around the city of Azaz. The operation would cover an area currently under Islamic State control, and it would attempt to secure a buffer zone for Turkey that would deeply hurt the extremist group, provide assistance to Syrian rebels and facilitate the resettlement of Syrian refugees. It would also drastically escalate Turkey's role in the conflict, making such a scenario highly unlikely.

 Other far more plausible scenarios for Turkish involvement have also emerged, including an operation that would provide increased support for the Free Syrian Army and artillery and airstrikes, but that would avoid the more sensitive prospect of introducing ground forces. It is almost certain that the Turks will ramp up their border control efforts as well, hurting the Islamic State's core supply lines through Turkey. It will be important to watch for raids and crackdowns on Islamic State-affiliated smuggling rings in the border towns.

The Politics of War

Domestic political considerations could be motivating talk of invading Syria, especially in the case of more risky options. Talk of a significant unilateral military operation against the Islamic State comes directly after an indecisive election in Turkey. The ruling Justice and Development Party could be trying to mobilize a voter reaction, particularly among the Nationalist Movement Party, as it looks to either build a coalition government or stage early elections.  

On top of domestic political motivations, the foreign implications of an operation in Syria are clear. Dealing a blow to the Islamic State would go a long way in repairing Turkey's relationship with the United States and NATO, which have accused Turkey of being complacent against the extremist group. That Turkey would largely avoid territory controlled by the Kurdish People's Protection Units will further mend the relationship. And targeting the Islamic State's flank, especially in the Jarabulus-Azaz zone, would greatly benefit the rebel forces in Aleppo province, enabling them to divert forces away from fighting the Islamic State to secure Aleppo city.

Despite the reasoning supporting potential operations, it is clear that any Turkish military campaign in Syria carries tremendous and varied risks. For instance, an operation to secure a buffer zone running from Jarabulus to Azaz in Syria would constitute nothing less than a major assault on the Islamic State. This specific border area is of paramount importance to the Islamic State, since it is its last significant link to foreign recruits and supplies. Thus, the extremist group could be expected to fight intensively against a Turkish intervention. The Turkish military would need to be prepared to sustain heavy casualties in difficult fighting against an enemy proficient in the use of guerilla strikes and suicide attacks.

Even more important, it is almost certain that the Islamic State would plan mass casualty terrorist attacks inside Turkey itself. The Turkish government probably has not cracked down on the Islamic State up to this point because it wants to avoid such attacks. The Islamic State has also, over time, developed an underground presence in Turkey, facilitating its lines of supplies and men into Syria. Given Turkey's delicate political and economic situation, numerous large-scale terrorist attacks in Turkish cities could have a significant destabilizing effect.

Wider Risks

Blowback from the Islamic State is not the only risk of military intervention. It is unclear how the Syrian government would react to an operation, despite the fact that it has no control over the targeted area. Already angry at Turkey's support for Syrian rebels fighting against its forces in the north, Damascus could militarily engage the Turkish forces crossing the border through ballistic missile strikes or air raids. While these methods probably would not hurt or even disrupt the Turkish operation, they would raise the stakes in an already dangerous conflict and could draw Turkey and potentially its allies deeper into the Syrian civil war.

Iran and Russia, both of which still strongly back the Syrian government, would also be unhappy with direct Turkish involvement in the conflict. Turkey maintains substantial economic links with Iran and Russia, and these countries could punish Turkey economically if it chooses to intervene in Syria. Addressing the reports of an impending Turkish military operation, Iranian Ambassador to Turkey Ali Reza Bikdeli even said that any such move by Turkey would destroy Ankara's ability to influence a peaceful settlement in Syria.

Some extreme rebel groups fighting the Islamic State, such as Jabhat al-Nusra, pose yet another risk to Turkey. While rebel groups such as those within the Free Syrian Army, the Shamiya Front and even allies of Jabhat al-Nusra within the Islamic Front may welcome a Turkish military operation against the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra's reaction remains unpredictable and tenuous. It is entirely possible that Turkish soldiers may find themselves fighting against more than one powerful Islamist group in Syria.

Intervention Is Still a Remote Possibility

Furthermore, reports from Turkey demonstrate that the Turkish military is still hesitant about an operation in Syria, despite the political will to move forward. The Turkish military is fully capable of completing the mission, but it is understandable that commanders would not be keen on commencing such an important operation without a clear mandate, especially given the uncertain political climate following the indecisive elections. Any mandate at this point could potentially be revoked with the new government. Absent strong Turkish military motivation, the mission is likely to suffer from a lack of coordination and purpose.

It is also worth mentioning that for all these risks, the fear that the Kurds will be targeted is not realistic. Turkey has made it vehemently clear that it will not tolerate the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in Syria, and so there is naturally considerable tension with the Kurdish People's Protection Units. However, the operation, as presently discussed in Turkish media, would largely ignore the Kurds. It would take place not only in an area devoid of Kurdish forces, but also in an area that the already overstretched Kurds have no real ability to occupy, regardless of Turkish military intervention. Talk of the way the operation would prevent the future linking of the Afrin and Kobani cantons misses the geographic and capability constraints on the Kurdish People's Protection Units.

A Turkish military move into Syria is still far from certain, but it is more likely now than ever. Raising the potential of such an incursion could be a political maneuver by the ruling government to secure additional votes from other parties in the runup to early elections. But if Turkey undertakes such an operation, it will have to manage multiple and varied consequences, domestically and abroad.

Syria Dilemma: Assad or the Terrorists

June 9, 2015

Neil Thompson

 

Syria’s disintegration into civil war since 2011 has created a strategic dilemma for Israel that the upcoming US-Iran deal will throw into stark relief. On the one hand Israeli security has benefited from the conflict in two concrete ways. Firstly its enemy the Syrian Baath party-state has partially collapsed, losing territory, allies like Gaza’s Hamas, and military resources. Secondly its northern border is quieter as Lebanon’s Hezbollah and its Iranian backers have been forced to divert men and money into propping up the Damascus regime. Shia-influenced Arab regimes in Beruit, Damascus, and Baghdad may one day form a hostile front against Tel Aviv but today each has Sunni militia groups that pose them more immediate problems.

On the other hand Sunni fundamentalist terrorist organizations like Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrah al-Sham (which recently claimed Syria’s Idlib province), and Islamic State (IS) are equally antithetical to any Arab-Israeli peace. Israel may not love the Arab regimes that surround it but it has learned to live with them. A tangle of Sunni jihadi principalities competing for recruits, money, and territory would make for violent, unstable neighbors, even if they spent most of their efforts fighting each other. Hezbollah has shown Israel that a hybrid party-militia with a religious group identity can be a more nimble security threat than a sclerotic dictatorship.

Syria’s conventional military threat to Israel, never large, has diminished drastically; its unconventional threats such as terrorist proxies or chemical weapons programs have been dismantled or unleashed against internal enemies. The Baath have been characteristically ruthless in their treatment of their domestic enemies but are reeling from a Turkish-Saudi backed rebel coalition in the north and a simultaneous IS thrust from the east. The fall of Palmyra shows the regime is suffering a manpower shortage and Damascus and its foreign allies have resorted to recruiting Afghan mercenaries and arming Palestinian factions in the Yarmouk refugee camp among other measures. Many Iraqi Shia militiamen have returned home to fight IS, aggravating Syrian government overstretch.

Preoccupied with Gaza Israel has largely kept out of Syria. Now however reports have surfaced of wounded al-Nusra gunmen receiving treatment in Israeli hospitals, making it likely that the present Israeli government sees the odious Damascus regime as still the major threat to Tel Aviv. In material terms this may seem so, but the Afghan precedent is not encouraging. In the 1980s the West and Arab monarchies collaborated to bring down the Soviet-backed communist regime and got al-Qaeda and the Taliban as eventual successors.

Israel may be correct when it calculates helping in the Assad’s regime end will check Iranian influence in the Arab world. It may also be that the range of forces now weighted against the government of Syria are such that it is already fatally compromised even without Israel’s minor interventions in the rebels’ favor; Syrian and international jihadi groups could become a regional force regardless of what Tel Aviv does. Nonetheless by helping Jabhat al-Nusra now Israelis may find they have more ideologically-motivated and less deterrable neighbors facing them in the future.

Regardless of whether a weakened Assad prevails or not, whichever side wins the Syrian civil war wiIl be anti-Israeli. Assad would need Iranian money to rebuild his country and Tehran remains staunchly hostile to Tel Aviv regardless of recent elections and movements on the nuclear issue. The issue of the Golan Heights would doubtless also prove a useful diversion for the more corrupt militias the regime has created and justify the patriotic need for their continued existence. Meanwhile the jihadi movement is openly anti-Semitic and theocratic in its worldview. The re-conquest of formerly Muslim Palestine would be a rhetorical device all its factions could employ to mobilize supporters.

For Israel, the best outcome would be mutual exhaustion and a negotiated settlement to a government of national reconciliation which kept Syria’s state apparatus intact but without Assad and his family at the top. A UN-backed treaty similar to the Taif Agreement that ended Lebanon’s civil war would empower the country’s Sunni majority while allowing the state to reassert its authority in territory currently abandoned to IS and the Syrian Kurdish militias. Such a government would be divided between Syria’s many communities and preoccupied with its own internal security, not the Arab-Israeli conflict.

April 2015

Saudi Arabia and Iran Compete in Yemen

 While the al-Houthi movement struggles to manage multiple regional challenges to its north, its rise to power in Yemen is a setback for Saudi Arabia on its southern flank. After the fall of the Yemeni government, Riyadh will have to capitalize on the al-Houthis' need for political and financial support to re-establish its influence in the country. But because Iran is trying to fill that support gap, too, Yemen has become another battleground where the two sectarian rivals will struggle against one another.

  After being  driven from the capital of Sanaa in September, Yemen's government is at war with itself. President Abd Rabboh Mansour Hadi issued a statement March 19 denouncing the airstrikes on his compound in the southern port city of Aden as an attempted military coup by forces loyal to his predecessor and onetime ally, former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Earlier that day, soldiers and militiamen loyal to Hadi battled their way into Aden's airport and stormed a nearby military base, both of which were under the control of Gen. Abdel-Hafez al-Saqqaf, a Saleh loyalist.

Keeping abreast of developments in Yemen? See also this free Stratfor video: Conversation: Yemen Spirals Out of Control

 The infighting in Aden comes after Ansar Allah, the pro-Iranian Zaidi group led by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, emerged as the single largest force in the country after taking over large swathes of territory in north and central Yemen. The al-Houthis represent a change in the balance of power in Yemen and even the Arabian Peninsula that has opened the door for Iran

 

Coming to Terms With the American Empire

  "Empire" is a dirty word, and considering the behavior of many empires, that is not unreasonable. But empire is also simply a description of a condition, many times unplanned and unintended. It is a condition that arises from a massive imbalance of power. It is rarely intended. Indeed, the empires created on purpose, like Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany, have rarely lasted. Most empires don't plan to be one. They become one and then realize what they are. Sometimes they do not realize what they are for a long time, and that failure to see reality has massive consequences.

World War II and the Birth of an Empire

 The United States became an empire in 1945. It is true that in the Spanish-American War, the United States intentionally took control of the Philippines and Cuba, and it is true that it began thinking of itself as an empire, but it really was not. Cuba and the Philippines were the fantasy of empire, and the fantasy dissolved during World War I, isolationism and the Great Depression.

 The genuine American empire that emerged was a byproduct of other events, rather than something intended. There was no great conspiracy. In some ways, the circumstances of its creation made it more powerful. The dynamic of World War II led to the collapse of the European Peninsula and its occupation by the Soviets and Americans. The same dynamic led to the occupation of Japan and its direct governance by the United States as a de facto colony, with Douglas MacArthur as viceroy.

 The United States now had an extraordinary empire. The United States also intended to abandon it. This was a genuine wish and not mere propaganda.

 

Why Russia Will Send More Troops to Central Asia

 

 Russia is making a concerted effort to increase its military and security presence throughout Central Asia, just not for the reasons it would have you think. Though the Kremlin is concerned with the threat of spillover violence from Islamist militancy in Afghanistan — its purported motive for deploying more troops — it is far more alarmed by what it sees as Chinese and Western encroachment into lands over which it has long held sway. It is this concern that will shape Moscow's behavior in Central Asia in the years to come.

  Central Asia has played an important role in the projection of Russian military power since the Russian Empire's expansion in the 18th and 19th centuries. During this period, Russia established military outposts as it competed with the British Empire for influence in the region. By the mid-19th century, Russia had brought modern-day Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan into its empire. In the early 20th century, the countries were incorporated into the Soviet Union.

 Russia's Geographic Challenge

 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia retained a military presence in Central Asia and played a major role in regional conflicts, such as the 1992-1997 Tajik civil war. Today Russia still has military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Kazakhstan is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a military bloc dominated by Moscow. And while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are not members of the bloc, they do have important security and military ties with Russia through arms purchases.

Concerns of Militancy

 Russia's long-standing influence in Central Asian military affairs frames several of the country's recent moves.  

 

January 2014

Trends in 2014

Assessment on what will underline the World in 2014

•Continuing diplomatic contacts and opening to the world by Iran detente relations with the United States

•China continue its strongman politics

•The rise of nationalist and extremist parties in Europe

•Domestic turmoil and economic stress in India and Turkey

•Russia and Germany bargain over Central/Eastern Europe and energy policy

 

The United States will attempt to balance power in the Middle East through its strategic negotiations with Iran; the rise of nationalist and Eurosceptic parties will be felt in this upcoming year’s elections; the Chinese president will continue to consolidate more power under himself. Barely missing the list but still notable: the end of the FARC insurgency in Colombia, escalating violence in Nigeria, and Mexico's return to political gridlock.

 

China's Credit Slowdown Raises Concerns About Overall Economic Health

 New economic data released by China's National Bureau of Statistics on Aug. 13 shows the supply of credit to the Chinese economy expanded by only $44.3 billion in July, the slowest pace in almost six years. To be precise, credit expanded at the slowest pace since October 2008, the month after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy and the month before the Chinese government launched an economic stimulus program that sheltered China's economy from the worst effects of the global financial crisis. That program also locked China into a growth model grounded in the intimate bond between government-led credit expansion and housing and infrastructure construction -- one that the Chinese government is now struggling, against time and at the risk of crisis, to escape.

 The dramatic and widely unexpected drop in Chinese credit supply in July has raised concerns that the economic "recovery" China seemed poised to make starting in June -- when aggregate financing in China hit a whopping $320 billion, which was more than seven times greater than July's figure -- has been nipped in the bud. There are also concerns that the coming months will bring even worse news from the world's second-largest economy. These concerns are aggravated by anecdotal reports repeated in mainstream news media saying July's decline is the result of the policy-driven credit tightening by the government and also reflects a drop in Chinese enterprises' demand for new loans. If the latter is the case, it raises important questions about the underlying health and trajectory of China's economy.

 

November 1013

Israelis, Saudis and the Iranian Agreement 

 A deal between Iran and the P-5+1 (the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany) was reached in November 2013. The Iranians agreed to certain limitations on their nuclear program while the P-5+1 agreed to remove certain economic sanctions. The next negotiation, scheduled for six months from now depending on both sides' adherence to the current agreement, will seek a more permanent resolution. The key players in this were the United States and Iran. The mere fact that the U.S. secretary of state would meet openly with the Iranian foreign minister would have been difficult to imagine a few months ago, and unthinkable at the beginning of the Islamic republic.

 The U.S. goal is to eliminate Iran's nuclear weapons before they are built, without the United States having to take military action to eliminate them. While it is commonly assumed that the United States could eliminate the Iranian nuclear program at will with airstrikes, as with most military actions, doing so would be more difficult and riskier than it might appear at first glance. The United States in effect has now traded a risky and unpredictable air campaign for some controls over the Iranian nuclear program.