Analysis

Febuar 2016

Karate -- head of the Shebab's Amniyat unit, a special security wing responsible for intelligence, attacks and assassinations -- is said to have been involved in plotting the 2015 massacre of 148 people at Garissa university in north-east Kenya."The Kenya Defence Forces, under AMISOM operations, would like to confirm that Mahad Mohammed Karate... and 10 other middle level commanders were killed in a major KDF strike," in southern Somalia on February 8, the statement read.The claims could not be independently verified, and there was no immediate reaction from the Shebab.Karate was at a Shebab training camp to "preside over the passing out of an estimated 80 Amniyat recruits who had completed their training, and were due for deployment to carry out more terrorist attacks," the Kenyan army said."It is confirmed that 42 recruits were also killed while many others sustained injuries."Karate was placed on the US State Department's wanted terrorist list in April 2015 after the Garissa attack."Karate, also known as Abdirahman Mohamed Warsame, played a key role in the Amniyat, the wing of the Shebab responsible for assassinations and the April 2, 2015 attack on Garissa University College," the US Rewards for Justice wanted notice reads."The Shebab's intelligence wing is involved in the execution of suicide attacks and assassinations in Somalia, Kenya and other countries in the region, and provides logistics and support for Shebab terrorist operations throughout the Horn of Africa."Karate was also the deputy of former leader Ahmed Godane, killed in a US drone strike in September 2014.Friday has been a busy day in the realm of terror. First, there were reports of an attack at an industrial gas plant outside Lyon, France, in which the attackers beheaded one of the plant's employees and attempted to spark a large explosion. Next came the report of a suicide bombing at a Shiite mosque in Kuwait City that reportedly killed around 25 people. Last came the deadliest attack of the day, in which 28 people, mostly tourists, were killed when gunmen opened fire at two seaside resorts in Tunisia.

Kuwait

In the Kuwait attack, the suicide bomber, who has been identified as 26-year-old Khaled al-Shamari, was able simply to walk into the center of the mosque without being challenged or searched. According to photos released from closed-circuit TV cameras at the mosque, he was wearing typical flowing robes, allowing him to conceal his bomb. The Islamic State's Wilayat Najd (or Saudi province) has claimed the bombing. This is not surprising because the group has claimed two previous attacks against Shiite mosques in Saudi Arabia. The Kuwait mosque was a soft target. In Saudi Arabia, the government and the Shiite community itself have put in place security measures to protect mosques following May attacks. This has made these Saudi mosques more difficult to infiltrate, perhaps pushing the attackers toward Kuwait. Like the May 22 and May 29 attacks in Saudi Arabia, the Kuwait City bombing was tactically unsophisticated.

With its attacks on Shiites, the Islamic State intends to spark sectarian violence similar to that seen in Iraq and Syria. The outbreak of sectarian infighting in these two countries has afforded the Islamic State room to operate. The group also aims to create problems for the Sunni regimes that will lead their security forces to focus on violent Shiite responses, not just jihadist violence. So far, Saudi Shiites have refused to rise to the Islamic State's bait. Despite the long-simmering sectarian tensions in Saudi Arabia, Shiite clerics have urged their communities to remain calm. It will be important to watch to see whether Kuwaiti Shiite leaders follow suit. Shiites in Kuwait have generally been better-integrated than in Saudi Arabia, so Shiite leaders there can be expected to urge calm rather than stoke unrest.

France

The attack in France was also quite simple in execution and involved a vehicle and a knife. It is the type of simple attack long advocated by al Qaeda through avenues such as Inspire Magazine and then encouraged by the Islamic State last fall. While beheadings are a jihadist method that predates al Qaeda, this attack is the first completed jihadist beheading in Western Europe. (Jihadists attempted but failed to behead a British soldier in London in May 2013.) France has long struggled with the jihadist threat, and the threat does not just emanate from the Islamic State. The al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula-inspired Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in January is still the deadliest terrorist attack in the West this year. If anything, it is surprising that here have not been more attacks in France given the number of radical jihadists there and the ease which which one can replicate an attack such as that carried out today using nothing more than a car and a knife.

The man arrested in connection with today's arrest was reportedly known to French authorities and had previously been under surveillance starting in 2006, but surveillance was reportedly dropped on him in 2008. This reflects how difficult it is for governments to conduct surveillance on a large number of potential threats over a long period of time. We previously discussed this problem within France in particular, in relation to the Mohammed Mera case in 2008.

Tunisia

Today Jihadists in Tunisia have also conducted their second simple attack directed against tourists. The first occurred in March, when gunmen attacked the Bardo Museum in Tunis. Like that attack, this one was operationally simple, involving gunmen with AK-47s targeting a vulnerable target. The Uqba ibn Nafi Brigade, which the Tunisian government blamed for the Bardo Museuam attack, had pledged its allegiance to the Islamic State. Jihadists in Tunisia also recently proclaimed an Islamic State wilayat, or province, in Tunisia, and this attack may be intended as a way for that new wilayat to establish itself on the global stage.

Tunisia's economy relies heavily on tourism and was already suffering from the consequences of the Bardo attack. This incident will compound the earlier damage. But beyond the economic damage, this attack will also cause many to question whether the government has the ability to keep the country safe from the jihadists. (For more on why hotels are appealing targets for jihadists, please read this special report on the militant threat to hotels.)

Coordination?

While all of these attacks occurred on the same day, they were all tactically simple and their execution did not show evidence of, nor did it require, any assistance from the Islamic State core group.

If there is any connection between the attacks it can be found in the timing. It is Ramadan, and the Islamic State has publicly encouraged its followers and sympathizers to conduct attacks during the holy month. Islamic State spokesman Abu Mohammed al-Adnani issued an audio statement on June 23 in which he urged his listeners to "Be keen to conquer in this holy month and to become exposed to martyrdom" and to make the month "a calamity for the infidels... Shiites and apostate Muslims."

A suicide bomber drove into the compound of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Hargeisa at around 10:00 a.m local time on 29th October, 2008.Initial reports indicate the death of 2 UN staff including the local security assistant and a driver from the UNOPS. At least 6 more UN staff were critically injured. Initial reports indicate that a Toyota Surf  with explosives was driven through the first gate which was open and the driver managed to open the second gate and put the vehicle in before it exploded causing an extensive damages to the building. Two more explosions were reported and targeted to Ethiopian Embassy and the Presidential Palace in Hargeisa. Other reports suggest that there has been similar attacks in Bosasso  of Puntland. Two compounds of Puntland Intelligence Service(PSI) were hit.More than 28 people were killed and several others were injured in Hargeisa  attack.

 

The Criminal and Terrorist Threat of Narco Submarine Technology

June 7, 2016

Byron Ramirez

 

Background

For several decades, international agencies such as Ameripol, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and the UNODC have worked incessantly with domestic law enforcement agencies to seize illicit drugs, arrest traffickers, and reduce the flow of narcotics into the United States and other countries. Through a series of bilateral, multilateral, regional, and global accords, governments and their militaries have increasingly cooperated in multiple anti-drug measures and operations designed to mitigate the threats presented by drug traffickers.

Transnational organized crime (TOC) has become an obstinate issue in international affairs. Organized crime affects the global economy and has the capacity to undermine the rule of law and governance of nations. Sustainable development, public health, and public safety are imperiled by the criminal activities of drug trafficking organizations.

In the United States, the Department of the Treasury, the Drug Enforcement Agency, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Navy, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Office of Air and Marine (AMO), Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Defense have designed comprehensive strategies aimed at addressing the corrosive effects of the illegal drug trade, including money laundering, corruption, terrorism, human trafficking, and economic distortion. For instance, the Department of the Treasury, through the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI), combats all aspects of money laundering committed by criminal organizations and terrorists. The Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South and the U.S. Southern Command have been conducting interagency detection and monitoring operations, and developed tactical approaches for the interdiction of illicit trafficking and the mitigation of other narco-terrorist threats in support of national and partner nation security.

The illicit drug trade is a profitable business. According to a 1997 World Drug Report published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, illicit drugs generated approximately $400 billion per year of total revenue. At that time, it was estimated that illicit drugs represented approximately 8 percent of total international trade. Since then, authorities have made numerous interdictions and arrests. Yet in 2015, the UNODC reported that the bulk weight (tons) of seized cocaine in the Americas in the year 2013 was at a level similar to the one reported in the year 2006. This is particularly concerning when we consider the resolute efforts made by law enforcement agencies during the past two decades.

 

The Rise of Narco-Submarines

During the late 1980s, Colombian drug cartels dominated the flow of cocaine into the United States and Europe. Through the use of go-fast boats and small planes, the Medellin Cartel and Cali Cartel delivered their illicit product throughout the Americas. However, the increased effectiveness of law enforcement agencies in detecting and seizing aircraft and boats, forced drug traffickers to consider developing alternative means for transporting and delivering narcotics to their intended destinations.

Drug cartels in Colombia began to experiment with narco submarines in the early 1990s. They tried to counteract ameliorated radar and communication technology held by militaries and law enforcement. Accordingly, drug traffickers made attempts to improve the design and operational capabilities of their narco submarines in order to gain the ability to further evade detection and seizure.

After the collapse of the Medellin and Cali Cartels, other criminal organizations such as FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) continued to invest in narco submarine technology. The design and engineering of narco submarines continued to evolve during the late 1990s and 2000s. Over time, these vessels became capable of self-propulsion and full submersion.  They were also able to travel longer distances while having an increased carrying capacity. Simultaneously, law enforcement developed advanced radar technology. And it was in the mid-2000s when authorities noticed great similarities in the design of the vessels they were seizing. These vessels resembled go fast-boats and were reconfigured so that they would sit just above the water line. This type of narco submarines became known as low profile vessels (LPVs).

During the past few years, U.S. authorities working alongside other Latin American militaries began to seize vessels – actual submarines – that were capable of full submersion. Many of these narco submarines were capable of reaching speeds of 15 miles per hour while carrying up to 10 tons of narcotics.  Some of these newer models were powered by 350 horse-powered diesel engines and carried large fuel tanks which allowed them to travel a range of up to 2,000 nautical miles. Because the majority of their structure was made out of fiberglass and they could navigate below the sea surface, these vessels became almost impossible to detect via sonar or radar.  Many of these vessels were built with upper lead shielding which helps minimize their heat signature and thus they can evade infrared sensors. Also, several models had piping along the bottom to allow the water to cool the exhaust as the vessel moves, making it even less vulnerable to infrared detection. These vessels also have ballast tanks and are equipped with a satellite global positioning system that aids their navigation.

 

Narco Submarines Today

Drug cartels have grown increasingly strategic and resourceful. Their vast profits allow them to invest in enhanced transportation technologies and innovative methods of evading capture. In recent years, narco submarines have been used by FARC and other criminal organizations (Los Rastrojos, Urabeňos) throughout the Western Hemisphere to transport narcotics from South America to Central and North America. These vessels travel usually from Western Colombia via the Pacific Ocean towards Central America and Mexico. They are also deployed from Northern Colombia via the Caribbean towards Central America and small islands located throughout the Caribbean region. However, the number of narco submarines has apparently risen as there are reports of seized narco submarines in Venezuela, Guyana, Ecuador, and Brazil.

Since 2012, Operation Martillo has led to the seizure of almost 700 metric tons of cocaine, detained over 1,800 suspects and 581 vessels and aircraft. Nonetheless, in spite of the success of these integrated efforts, maritime drug smuggling activities continue.

It is worth taking into consideration that the UNODC’s 2015 World Drug Report recently reported:

“While maritime trafficking is not the most widely used mode of smuggling drugs, law enforcement operations at sea have potentially the greatest impact as the average volumes of seizures is proportionally higher. In the period 2009-2014, for instance, the average for each seizure by sea was 365kg, while by land (road and rail) it was 107kg and by air 10kg.”

This suggests that law enforcement should continue to focus on maritime interdiction and cooperation with allies. Collaboration is imperative to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of ongoing interdiction efforts. In order to adequately disrupt drug trafficking operations in the Americas, agencies must improve their exchange of intelligence, share best practices, and invest in various types of technology.

 

Challenges to Countering Narco Submarines

In July 2011, the National Security Council released its Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. The report explains that transnational organized crime (TOC) poses a significant and growing threat to national and international security. Moreover, TOC yields ominous implications for public safety, health, democratic institutions, and economic stability across the globe. The report indicates that criminal networks are expanding and diversifying their activities, which in turn leads to the amplified convergence of threats to national security.

Among the key priority areas that are included in the Council’s strategy are: protecting the financial system and strategic markets against transnational organized crime; strengthening interdiction, investigations, and prosecutions; disrupting drug trafficking and its facilitation of other transnational threats; and building international capacity, cooperation, and partnerships.

Following these aims, the U.S. Coast Guard has been collaborating with the U.S. Navy and other agencies.  These interagency partnerships have utilized military surveillance aircraft and nuclear fast attack submarines to search for vessels carrying narcotics. Furthermore, the Coast Guard has also been using HC-130 Hercules aircraft which provide surveillance and tracking of drug trafficking vessels.

Notwithstanding the increased cooperation and integration of activities between law enforcement agencies, governments, and other stakeholders, drug trafficking organizations continue to propagate threats to U.S. national security and the security of other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Just to complicate matters a bit more, budget cuts in the U.S. have led to limited funding for maritime surveillance, interception, and seizure efforts.

In March 2015, Marine General John Kelly, commander of (SOUTHCOM) U.S. Southern Command, testified before the Armed Services Committee about the security challenges that the United States faces. In his testimony, General Kelly noted:

“[Our friends across the region] are frustrated by what they perceive as the low prioritization of Latin America on our national security and foreign policy agendas, which is especially puzzling given the shared challenge of transnational organized crime……. The tentacles of global networks involved in narcotics and arms trafficking, human smuggling, illicit finance, and other types of illegal activity reach across Latin America and the Caribbean and into the United States, yet we continue to underestimate the threat of transnational organized crime at significant and direct risk to our national security and that of our partner nations.”

General Kelly added the following statement about terrorist organizations that are part of the global criminal network:

“As I stated last year, terrorist organizations could seek to leverage those same smuggling routes to move operatives with intent to cause grave harm to our citizens or even bring weapons of mass destruction into the United States.”

General Kelly also pointed out that reduced funding has limited SOUTHCOM’s activities:

“as the lowest priority Geographic Combatant Command, ‘doing less with less’ has a disproportionate effect on our operations, exercises, and engagement activities…… we are managing to keep the pilot light of U.S. military engagement on in the region — but just barely.”

In similar fashion, last year the U.S. Coast Guard reported that it is having difficulties capturing narcotics smuggled into the U.S. because of an aging fleet that needs constant maintenance and repairs. Ever since the 2009 across-the-board sequestration budget cuts, the USCG has not been able to upgrade or replace its ships making interdiction efforts increasingly onerous.

 

Conceivable Threats to International Security

It is not known how many of these vessels continue to travel undetected and ultimately reach their intended destinations. It is difficult to determine how many drug carrying vessels are currently being deployed and which specific routes they are using. Drug traffickers consider captured vessels as part of the cost of doing business. In spite of the interdictions to date, we can suppose that drug traffickers continue to use this transportation method as it continues to yield high profits even when the risk of capture and cost of interdiction are factored into the cost-benefit analysis. It is not known how many of these narco-sub vessels are currently under construction and in operation throughout South America and Central America.  Based on recent history we can be certain that drug smugglers will continue to search for effective ways of transporting and delivering their product even if law enforcement authorities continue to detect, intercept, and disrupt narcotics distribution.

The conceivable threats to international security become increasingly complex and acute when we recognize that some drug trafficking organizations have been linked with terrorism.  For over 50 years, FARC has carried out bombings, extortions, assassinations, and kidnappings throughout Colombia. In an effort to finance its agenda, FARC has engaged in drug trafficking operations that include the use of narco submarines. There are also the cases of individuals with suspected ties to Al-Qaida, the Taliban, and Hezbollah who have been involved in drug related activities. Some of these funds from drug trafficking activities have been used to finance terrorist activities.

It is not clear to what extent criminal organizations are involved in financially, logistically, and operationally supporting the efforts of terrorist groups. Yet, there are indications that these networks could facilitate the movement of terrorist operatives or weapons of mass destruction toward U.S. borders as well as high-value targets in the Western Hemisphere. Despite the fact that law enforcement has seized several vessels, many other narco submarines have traveled undetected and almost completely unrestricted. This makes them increasingly perilous to international security.

It is feasible that criminal-terrorist cooperation could deliver great damage via the use of narco submarines that could carry weapons or parts of weapons of mass destruction, biological warfare agents, and chemical weapons. Terrorist organizations have in the past used the international illicit marketplace to finance their activities, purchase equipment, and potentially could deploy narco submarines as vessels of mass destruction.

Hezbollah has supporters in Lebanese diaspora communities in Latin America. There have been illicit activities such as money laundering and drug trafficking in the Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, which generated revenue that was later transferred to Hezbollah. For decades, Iran has funded, provided weapons, and trained terrorists. During the past several years there has been increased cooperation between Iran and Ecuador, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba. Although the nature of the cooperation appears to be related to economic exchange, it is important to realize that other types of cooperation could potentially exist between individuals from these countries which could in turn pose threats to U.S. national security and the security of other countries in the region. Furthermore, there are some recent cases of terrorists who have traveled to Latin America and have been arrested near the U.S. border.

Narco submarines constitute an eminent threat when we consider that their design and technology have evolved, and thus they are proficient in avoiding detection and capture. These vessels are equipped with advanced navigation systems, satellite communication, and radars. They can travel long distances undetected evidenced by the copious narco submarines that have been detected throughout the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea.

A terrorist group such as FARC could feasibly collaborate with Al Qaeda or Hezbollah and equip narco submarines with added technical features that would enable terrorist organizations to launch destructive attacks on U.S. targets throughout the Americas. Given their capacity to travel long distances, narco submarines could also be deployed to European coasts and coastal cities. In addition to carrying biological and chemical weapons, narco submarines could also transport terrorist operatives to target locations.

 

Policy Considerations

Advances in narco submarine technology have certainly presented challenges to law enforcement authorities and militaries throughout the continent. Low profile vessels can mask their heat signature, evade sonar and radar, and use lead siding to help mask their infrared signature. These particular technical aspects make their detection and capture exceedingly difficult. In order to be able to counteract drug smugglers’ innovative technology, law enforcement must also invest in upgrading their own set of technologies.

In order to thwart existing maritime drug trafficking activities as well as reduce the threat of potential terrorist attacks, law enforcement agencies and militaries must enhance cyber intelligence capabilities. It is crucial that organizations such as Interpol, Europol, Ameripol, and the International Association of Chiefs of Police strengthen cooperation and information sharing. Authorities must seek to strengthen efforts to interdict illicit trafficking in the air and maritime domains. It is critical that TOC networks are disrupted including their access to finance and their ability to use technology such as narco submarines to deploy biological and chemical attacks.

Law enforcement must target the nexus among TOC networks that are involved in drug trafficking, arms trafficking, and terrorist activities. Agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Navy, in cooperation with other international agencies must continue to: collect and share information and data; use technology such as UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles), satellite-based computer systems, and sensors; integrate ISR systems; enhance the joint tactical radio system; upgrade wideband satellite communications; further utilize horizontal fusion; invest in MASINT (Measurement and Signals Intelligence), CHIMS (Counterintelligence / Human Intelligence Information Management Systems), and modeling and simulation software that allows analysts to simulate events, their probabilities, and a range of potential outcomes.

All of these operations and enhanced technologies that are necessary to protect countries from these potential threats will require additional funding. It is pivotal that public officials, policy makers, and other stakeholders consider the current limitations that exist today, evaluate the challenges that lie ahead, and assess how these preceding threats may be mitigated effectively in the near future.

 

Who are Al-Shabaab?

Adan Garaar, mastermind of Al-Shabaab's deadly raid on Nairobi's Westgate mall in 2013, was reportedly killed last month in Somalia by a U.S. drone strike. But the group hasn't missed a beat.

In November, it ambushed a bus in Kenya, killing everyone who couldn't recite verses of the Quran. Last week, the group raided a hotel in Mogadishu, killing a Somali diplomat and others. And earlier this week, Uganda's lead prosecutor in the trial over an Al-Shabaab massacre in Kampala in 2010 was shot dead, according to The Guardian.

This week, the Kenyan air force bombarded two al-Shabaab camps in Gedo, a Somali region on the border with Kenya. The number of kills is not known, nor is it clear what role they played in the attack in Garissa University, but it’s Kenya’s first military response after the bloody attack that killed 148 students on April 2.

The Kenyan military was retaliating against yet another brutal attack against civilians. About six months earlier, on June 16, 2014, Kenya was rocked by another brutal mass murder. On that occasion, al-Shabaab raided two hotels in the coastal town of Mpekotoni where people had gathered to watch the World Cup. Nearly 50 people, mostly civilians, were massacred by machine gun fire. The list of al-Shabaab attacks is so long that only the most recent and heinous are remembered. In Kenya everyone remembers the tragic afternoon of Saturday September 21, 2013, when al-Shabaab broke into the Westgate mall in Nairobi, killing 67 people, including 13 foreigners, and injuring 200. Somalis remember as well because, less than two months ago, militants attacked the Central Hotel in Mogadishu, frequented by Somali government officials.