Kenya’s seaside looks peaceful, but a murderous war is being wagedTourists may be returning to the Kenyan coast, but the hinterland is being ravaged by Islamic militants, their defectors and armed police

Tourists have returned to Kenya’s beaches but are unaware of the death toll in the battle for locals’ hearts and minds Photograph: Alamy Stock Photo

Jason Burke in Bongwe

Sunday 28 August 2016 08.00 BST  

A football field and a grove of mango trees lie between Bongwe and its neighbouring village. On one side live the family of 33-year-old Subira Mwangole, shot dead by gunmen while watching television with friends one evening in May. On the other live his alleged murderers.

The two villages, 30km south of the port city of Mombasa on Kenya’s coast, are almost identical: three-room houses with rusting tin or thatch roofs, a ramshackle primary school, a government office, a small mosque with white walls stained by rain, a crossroads where two tracks meet, a well, small plots of tall corn plants.

Yet, despite their placid appearances, the villages lie on the invisible frontline of a brutal, low-level, three-way war pitting security agencies against the Islamic extremist network al-Shabaab, and the militants against the local community. It is a war carried out by small groups of armed men who shoot first and ask few questions.

 

“We are very anxious, frightened. He knew he could die at any moment. We all know we could be next,” said Ibrahim, a former al-Shabaab fighter and a close relative of Mwangole.

There is a steady beat of violence. The extremists murder those they see as a threat. Local human rights groups say the police do the same thing. Both sets of killers know that the fear they provoke brings impunity.

Mwangole was particularly hated by al-Shabaab for his role in convincing veterans of the movement to take advantage of an amnesty offered by the Kenyan ministry of the interior last year. The shopkeeper and father of two was himself a defector from the group, which has waged an insurgency in Somalia since 2006 and has expanded across the porous border into Kenya.

Mwangole was shot in the head by a group of men dressed as policemen but identified by family members as local members of al-Shabaab. His death was swiftly followed by the murder, in similar circumstances, of three community leaders in Bongwe. All were involved in government “anti-radicalisation” schemes.

Hundreds have died at the hands of Islamic militants in Kenya in recent decades. A first wave of violence between 1998 and 2002 was directed by al-Qaida against foreign targets, including US embassies and Israeli tourists. It had ebbed by the middle of the last decade.

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But radicalism was growing among Kenya’s Muslim minority, fuelled by a sense of marginalisation, extremist clerics, the impact of the US-led “war on terror” and a shift away from traditional moderate Islamic practices to more rigorous versions of the faith influenced by countries in the Gulf.

In 2013 gunmen from al-Shabaab stormed a shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya’s capital, killing 67 people. Last year 148 people were shot dead at a university in Kenya’s north-east. Both attacks were launched from Somalia, where Kenyan troops are fighting the extremists as part of an African Union force, but focused attention on support networks within Kenya itself.

Investigators found that young men from villages such as Bongwe in Kwale county had been travelling to Somalia to fight with al-Shabaab for over a decade. Authorities launched a major crackdown and, officials say, a comprehensive “anti-radicalisation” strategy. One element was the amnesty announced last year. By this spring, 70 al-Shabaab veterans – or returnees – had made a clean breast of their militant past to authorities, receiving an assurance that they would not be prosecuted in return.

According to local journalists and former al-Shabaab fighter Sami, who worked closely with Mwangole and was a friend, two amnestied returnees have since been killed, as have six other al-Shabaab veterans.

“We trusted the government. We thought we could live a better life, in peace, and put our past behind us,” Sami said.

Many amnestied veterans receive constant threats from militants, while also facing harassment from police. “The government issued an amnesty that was not anchored in law,” said Hussein Khaled, of Haki-Africa, a human rights monitoring group in Mombasa.

The identity of the alleged killers of Mwangole and the three community leaders reveals how, despite the extremist rhetoric of “global jihad”, the conflict being fought out in Kwale is very intimate.

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In interviews with the Observer, Mwangole’s relatives and friends blamed a band of a dozen young men from the neighbouring village for the murders in Bongwe. Most are in their 20s and only recently recruited to al-Shabaab. They include several relatives of the victims. Well before the four murders in May, the group had already made a series of threats to amnestied veterans, accusing them of treachery and spying for the government.

Sami, who returned from a stint in Somalia with al-Shabaab six years ago, said: “We went to the police. We identified those threatening us, but they did nothing. Sometimes I think they wanted Mwangole to be killed – that’s why they gave him no protection.”

In June, police detained 10 men for the killings, including three of those named by Mwangole’s relatives. They say they are confident they have now broken up the network. This has inspired little confidence in Bongwe, however, where the authorities are as feared as al-Shabaab. Campaigners claim systematic human rights abuses by the police, including 70 extrajudicial “executions” or disappearances in the past year alone in and around Mombasa.

Many such killings and disappearances involve former members of al-Shabaab, or individuals alleged to be extremists. At least three alleged members of al-Shabaab in Kwale have been shot dead by police in recent months.

One, named as Omar Hesbon Matheka, died on 4 June when he was “running while shooting at the police”, according to officials, who claimed a grenade had been found among the dead man’s possessions. Witnesses said Matheka was killed by officers while sitting in a rickshaw. His mother told local newspapers that the 24-year-old was looking for work

Riscul tensiunilor sociale in ajunul alegerilor prezidentiale in Kenya
Anul 2013 va fi marcat de desfasurarea alegerilor prezidentiale si de retragerea din viata politica a actualului presedinte Mwai Kibaki care nu mai poate candida pentru un al treilea mandat datorita prevederilor noii Constitutii. Consensul politic urmat de coalitia guvernamentala a partidului prsedintelui Kibaki - Party of National Unity (PNU) si Miscarea democratica portocalie a primului ministru Raila Odinga este de asteptat sa continue pana la alegeri. Campania electorala se desfasoara normal in acest moment dar se poate prevedea o deteriorare cu risc de degenerare in confruntari violente inter-etnice. Natura posibilor evenimente este generata de intarzieri de implementare a reformelor prevazute in Constitutie cu precadere cele legate de partajarea puterii la nivel local. In ciuda deretiorarii relatiilor cu Somalia, Kenya va continua sa intareasca relatiile sale in regiune si sa se implice major in Comunitatea Est Africana.

 

Analiza de risc

Rating de tara : Mediu foarte incert politic si economic cu multe slabiciuni si probleme  car pot avea un impact semnificativ in plati globale. Probabilitatea aparitiei de deficiente de ansamblu este mare.

Ratingul climatului de afaceri: Climatul de afaceri este dificil. Informatiile financiare de ansamblu nu sunt adeseori disponibile. Recuperarea datoriilor este incerta. Cadrul institutional are multe defecte si slabiciuni. Tranzactiile inter-companii comporta riscuri majore intr-un mediu dificil.

Parti tari

·         Pozitie strategica intre Estul si Westul Africii

·         Tara membra a Pietei commune Africane, EAC (East African Community)

·         Diversificarea agriculturii (porumb, ciai, cafea, horticultura)

·         Bune telecomunicatii si servicii financiare

·         Dinamica demografica si cresterea numerica a clasei mijlocii

·         Adoptarea noii Constitutii

Slabiciuni

·         Productia Agricola dependenta de conditiile climaterice

·         Inadecvata infrastructura pentru absobtia dezvoltarii economice

·         Saracia

·         Guvernarea se mbunatateste dar coruptia ramane

·         Riscuri latente de excese politice

Scenarii

Luand in cosiderare istoria recenta a Kenyei si trendul demografic, trei potentiale scenarii par a fi posibile si ar putea reconfugura Kenya in viitorii 10 ani. Aceste scenarii depind insa de modul in care Kenya va decide sa continue reformele, sa continue pe calea consolidarii democratiei si competitivitati economice. Aceste doua alternative, in ordinea mentionata, se refera la continuarea politicii de catre vechea garda, guvernarea de catre o coalitie de reformatori si oportunisti intentionati a consolida democratia si a moderniza economia sau un colaps politic dupa 2013, similar perioadei de dupa alegerile din 2007, dar fara aranjamente negociate urmate de interventia armatei si politiei.

-Continuarea politicii de catre vechea garda. Sub acest scenariu, politica si etnicitatea continua sa fie forta dominanta pentru cel putin doua cicluri de alegeri. Judecarea si pedepsirea autorilor violentelor si destabilizarii Kenyei din 2008 pate esua sau incheia printr-un rezultat mixt. Alianta KKK (Kalenjin, Kikuyu,  Kamba) ar castiga alegerile din 2013 pentru presedintie si Adunarea Nationala cu Kalonzo Musyoka presedinte. In cazul acestui scenariu, reformele vor fi mai blande, implementarea noii Constitutii va fi mai putin agresiva decat in cazul castigarii alegerilor de catre o coalitie de reformatori si oportunisti pentru democratie. In acest scenariu Kenya va fi guvernata intr-o maniera similara celei de pe timpul primului mandat Kibaki, mai competitiva decat guvernarea Moi dar mai ancorata in trecut. Procesul catre o consolidare a democratiei va fi mai incet dar previsiunile Noii Constututii vor fi folosite pentru controlul puterii. In acelasi timp se va incerca o dezmembrare a centrelor de putere create in jurul liderilor celor mai numeroase grupuri etnice. Kenya va deveni mai stabila dar coruptia va persista.

-Guvernarea de catre o coalitie de reformatori si oportunisti care ar intentiona sa consilodeze democratia si a moderniza economia. O astfel de coalitie ar fi condusa de Raila Odinga si ar fi sustinuta de toate grupurile etnice major cu exceptia Kalenjin si Kikuyu. Ar putea cu timpul sa castige suportul membrilor grupului etnic Kikuyu din mediul urban si de afaceri precum si al kenienilor cu acest profil. Mai simplu, vor primi suport de la coalitia etnica si a clasei de mijloc dinamica si mai educata. Probabilitatea de a ajunge la putere a unei astfel de coalitii nu este foarte mare dar, liderii acestui grup, incluzand James Orengo, locotenentul lui Odinga, ar putea aduce un suport substantial implementarii reformelor economice, politice si judiciare, pentru restabilirea odinii, respectarea legii si reformarea politiei. In cazul in care Raila nu va castiga prima runda de alegeri, in turul doi, coalitia care l-a sustinut este foarte probabil sa nu-i mai dea acelasi suport.

- colaps politic inainte sau dupa alegerile 2013, similar perioadei de dupa alegerile din 2007, dar fara aranjamente negociate urmate de interventia armatei si politiei. Repatarea declansarii violentelor din 2007 este a fi luata in  considerare.

Reevaluarea Comisiei Electorale si infiintarea unor noi forte de securitate incluzand o predispunere a fortelor de securitate reduc probabilitatea declansarii de violente in Kenya. In caz de dezordine majora, este posibil ca un alt guvern de unitate nationala sa fie organizat si pus in functiune. Se poate considera de a semenea faptul ca o interventie a fortelor armate in rezolvarea problemelor interne nu este foarte probabila. De la obtinerea independentei din 1962, nu s-a constatat nicio ocazie in care fortele armate sa intervina pentru restabilirea ordinii in tara.

Scenarii putin probabile dar posibile sunt legate de declansarea dezordini generale prin asasinarea unor lideri politici majori. In istoria recenta a Kenyei se poate reaminti asasinarea a trei lideri politici in anii 60 si a ministrului de externe in 1990. Roberto Ouko, ministrul de externe din 1990 a fost asasinat de unul din locotenentii presedintelui Moi. Asasinarea unuia din candidatii la presedintie, Uhuru Kenyatta, Kalonzo Musyoka, Raila Odinga, or william Ruto or unul din apropiatii asociati ar crea o situatie exploziva, mai ales datorita divizarii etnice, si ar constitui motivul de repetare a violentelor din 2008. O astfel de surpriza nu poate fi neglijata.

Concluzii

Luand in considerare cele doua prime scenarii prezentate, care ar fi implicatiile pentru Statele Unite si Comanda americana pentru Africa (AFRICOM) ?  Statele Unite au recunoscut demult importanta  Kenyei ca ancora pentru tarile Est Africane si a investit multiple resurse. SUA este reprezentata in Kenya de catre UN Agency for international development USAID, Centre pentru controlul si prevenirea imbolnavirilor ( Centers for diseases Control and Prevention ) Departamentul pentru Aparare, Departamentul pentru agricultura, Libraria Congresului, Corpul de pace precum si de alte departamente. Prezenta americana si mai ales eforturile depuse de USAID pentru intarirea Adunarii Nationale a Kenyei demonstreaza importanta stabilitatii pentru USA. Relatiile Kenyei cu USA sunt din ce in ce mai stranse. Guvernul SUA va continua sa sprijine aforturile Kenyei progresul pentru democratie si stabilitate.

In alta odine de idei, liderii politici ai Kenyei au fost si sunt implicati in aplicarea reformelor rezultate din Noua Constitutie. Totul depinde de modul in care acesti lideri politici vor proteja interesele tarii sau cele personale.