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An Election Crisis in Democratic Republic of Congo Could Mean War

Back in January, the capital of Kinshasa and other cities were rocked by widespread protests when Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) President Joseph Kabila’s regime tried to pass a law requiring a national census to be held before future elections. The opposition reacted furiously, accusing the president, who has been in power since 2001, of seeking to prolong his term in office. Eventually the census proposal was dropped and the government backed off, announcing that presidential elections would be held in November 2016. That clock is now ticking, and there are few indications the government is seriously preparing for a post-Kabila future. On the contrary, events in neighboring Burundi may be encouraging some people around the president to think again.

As electoral norms spread through sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s, a number of strongmen emerged who rigged elections to keep themselves in power indefinitely. Term limits were introduced into the constitutions of countries like Burundi or the Congo precisely to prevent the emergence of such an electoral dictatorship. Alas from Russia to Turkey to eastern Africa, in the twenty-first century elected autocrats have learned to manipulate constitutions and exploit weak judicial systems to their advantage. Now the apparent success of Burundi’s Pierre Nkurunziza in side-stepping constitutional term limits in Burundi shows how the spirit of the law can still be evaded if a legal pretext can be patched together by the party in power.

The politics of Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo have all been tragically tied together by conflict and instability spreading from one to the other, so Burundi’s example does not auger well for its fragile neighbours’ future stability and good governance. President Nkurunziza’s claim that his first term in office should not be counted because he had not been elected has a certain plausibility but was grossly irresponsible in a fragile and ethnically divided polity. At the first sign of a serious backlash a statesman would have dropped his bid and allowed a caretaker government to oversee a proper election. Instead, after stacking the constitutional court with his supporters, Nkurunziza is accused of pressuring it to rule in his favor so he could stand for a third term behind a façade of judicial approval.

He had to ride out violent opposition protests and a coup attempt that together cost dozens of lives, but he has managed to secure himself an extra few years in power.

Few people believe the Burundian president’s claims to respect legal and constitutional restraints on his power and prerogatives. In an unprecedented rebuff, Nkurunziza’s re-election was not even observed by the African Union. Alas, in the bear-pits of his neighbors’ politics many leaders will be keen to follow his recent example. For example, there are no doubts that the fourteen year-old regime of Joseph Kabila next door is any less devious in protecting its monopoly on executive power. With the right court rulings and parliamentary maneuvering, the DRC’s own term limit issue could be circumvented. Mr Kabila could swap chair whilst remaining in power simply by stripping the presidency of its powers whilst increasing those of another power center such as the prime minister’s office. As the reaction on the streets of Kinshasa in January showed however, there are few signs it could be done without bloodshed.

Sadly the present Kinshasa regime has precious little democratic traditions to restrain its maneuverings. The current president inherited his position from his father when the latter was assassinated. The presidential incumbent before that was another Joseph, the infamous Mobutu, who looted the DRC for thirty years and murdered or exiled any political opposition. Four years prior to the present drama in Burundi, the DRC’s 2011 election results had already brought opposition accusations that the Congo’s Supreme Court had not examined electoral results thoroughly enough when it awarded the victory to the incumbent Kabila administration. How much truth there is in this matters less than the fact that many in the Congolese opposition are likely to believe the judiciary is biased against them. If the DRC’s Court became an actor in any kind of constitutional crisis in the run up to next year’s elections it would not be seen as a neutral institution but as a tool of the ruling Kinshasa clique.

In the African Great Lakes region contests for power within states are always nerve-wracking moments for their neighbors because of the ease with which instability in one can spread to the others. The Second Congo War is a prime example of this transmission of instability from one part of the Great Lakes region through porous borders to another. The conflict was triggered in aftermath of the Rwandan genocide when ‘Hutu power’ extremists fled from their country into eastern Congo following their defeat at the hands of Tutsi forces. Since the eastern DRC was home to previous waves of Hutu and Tutsi refugees from both Burundi and Rwanda and their descendants, the Rwandan Hutu militias swiftly added to eastern Congo’s own swirling bush wars, and brought their genocidal ideology with them. A much wider war was sparked when Kinshasa prevaricated and seemed unable or unwilling to control the situation in the east. Rwanda and Uganda promptly invaded and placed Joseph Kabila’s father Laurent in power, trigging a region-wide struggle involving nine African states. Millions died across the DRC and peace has only sporadically returned since then.

The weakness of the DRC to armed incursions from its neighbors is reason to be concerned when those states start to look fragile themselves. The peace between the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi remains extremely brittle. In the east of the Congo the remnants of the Rwandan Hutu militias, local Mai-Mai militants, and assorted other armed groups still pose a threat to civilians, if not to Kinshasa. Meanwhile in May, as tensions in Burundi escalated, the Rwandan government seemed to be preparing the diplomatic ground for an armed intervention if ethnic killings broke out there. Fortunately the Burundi situation has been resolved for now without escalating into inter-ethnic fighting, both because President Nkurunziza’s re-election bid was opposed by many members of his own Hutu ethnic group, and because he successfully seems to have bought off some of the opposition, splitting it politically.

Much money, time, and energy has been spent by the international community in Burundi, Rwanda, and the DRC trying to prevent a return to the tidal wave of blood that soaked all three countries between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s. That may all be at risk if the Kabila regime takes a leaf from President Nkurunziza’s book. Repeated rebellions against Kinshasa, some of them backed from neighboring Rwanda and Uganda, have rocked the DRC since the end of the Second Congo War, which ran from 1997 to about 2003. It is a testament both to the weakness of the Congo’s central government and the susceptibility of the DRC’s east to its neighbors that the embers of Rwandan-linked revolts were not fully stamped out until 2013, and that the Kabila regime needed repeated international intercessions to do so.

It is therefore difficult to see how Kinshasa can extended Joseph Kabila’s term of office as neatly as Pierre Nkurunziza has in Burundi. The DRC is a much larger country than its neighbors and there are simply too many armed groups beyond the control of the security forces. Meanwhile the army itself is divided and weak, full of former rebel fighters and widely distrusted for its corruption and brutality. Any bid by Kinshasa to stay in power using a legalistic fig-leaf would almost certainly trigger a new revolt in the east and possibility other parts of the DRC and if Kabila’s actions were to spark another uprising against his regime it is debatable if the West would intervene to save him.

However it would also be difficult for neighboring governments in Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda to overlook the security and financial incentives of meddling in the DRC’s factional politics. If one country starts to back an armed movement, the others will follow suit, threatening a return to regional instability. Despite the dangers, the temptation for Kabila to stay on somehow will be strong, as will the pressure on him from members of his inner circle. The DRC’s best hope is that President Kabila has learned from his father and his namesake’s mistakes and does not try to outstay his welcome as President Nkurunziza has done in Burundi. Peace in the Great Lakes region could soon depend on the Congo not following in its neighbor’s footsteps.

 East Africa's existing transport infrastructure is limited in its capacity and efficiency. If the countries in East Africa are to expand their commercial operations and attract new activity, particularly manufacturing, more reliable transportation networks will be needed.

The Central Corridor transport route is crucial to the movement of exports (especially mining exports) from inland areas to the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam. However, the railroads in the Central Corridor need to be upgraded, if not replaced outright. Countries with interests in the region, including China and Japan, have offered to invest in development projects, and Tanzania is planning several railway expansions. But other constraints, including a lack of capacity at Dar es Salaam, will remain.

Analysis

Most of East Africa's infrastructure development focuses on the region surrounding Lake Victoria and extends into the Great Lakes region. Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi are all located in the fertile and mineral-rich area that wraps around the lakes. The main purpose for establishing reliable transport infrastructure in the region is to strengthen the connection between the inland states, located west of Lake Victoria, to the ports on the East African coast. Two routes have emerged to achieve this goal: the Central Corridor, which runs south of the lake through Tanzania, and the Northern Corridor, which runs north of the lake through Kenya. While these routes do not necessarily compete for internal traffic, they do compete for external investment. There is also a Southern Corridor that runs south from Tanzania, but this corridor caters more to what comes in and out of Central Africa's mining regions.

Existing and Proposed Transport Arteries of East Africa These arteries of surface transport, which connect to smaller, local nodes, are essential to the development of the regional economy and are driven by national interests. The region's economic activity, and the population supporting it, is concentrated along Lake Victoria and farther inland in the Great Lakes basin. These local economies are driven mostly by primary industries -- the extraction and production of raw materials, agriculture, mining and potentially oil and natural gas. However, the East African region, particularly Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, shows potential for developing a low-end manufacturing base. Initial investments across several sectors, such as textile manufacturing, have already been noted in these countries.

The transport routes are focused mostly on regional trade and international exports. These exports mostly consist of coffee, tea and mining products. The corridors are not just essential for moving these goods into international markets; they are also critical for the provisioning of agricultural and mining projects and emerging sectors. However, the existing surface transport network -- consisting of roads and railways -- faces constraints in capacity and efficiency that limit the region's ability to attract investment in complementary industrial and utility sectors. The existing network is also insufficient to scale up mining activity (although increased mining activity, especially in the adjoining eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, would also require more political and security stability).

Central Corridor: Constraints and Development

The Central Corridor connects the port of Dar es Salaam to the inland regions of Tanzania and to Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo's Kivu provinces. This corridor comprises a network of roads and railways passing Lake Victoria to the south. Along this route, it also taps into East Africa's most established mining region: the greenstone belts of Tanzania. Its farthest extension into the Democratic Republic of the Congo also taps into the limited mining activity in the Great Lakes region. The minerals extracted here are exported through Africa's eastern ports because geographic constraints and a lack of infrastructure make transport westward through the Democratic Republic of the Congo impossible. The main focus of the Central Corridor, however, continues to be Tanzania's economy due to the limited amount of goods going in and out of Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Surface Transport Infrastructure in the Central Corridor Along the Central Corridor, roads still carry the bulk of traded goods; railways transport only about 10 percent of total goods, mainly because Tanzania's railroads need to be upgraded. The backbone of the Central Corridor is the Central Rail Line that runs between Dar es Salaam and Kigoma in western Tanzania. While this railway was designed to handle 5 million metric tons of cargo per year, it currently only carries less than 10 percent of its capacity.

Projects are underway to overhaul this railroad. Countries such as China and Japan have offered support and funding to refurbish the railroads and purchase new locomotives and carriages, although much of the money required to completely renovate the existing railway network -- an estimated $1 billion -- has not been secured yet.

In the short term, transport along the Central Corridor could benefit from upgrades to the railroad, while in the medium term it could benefit most from the use of more trains. In the long term, however, Tanzania may be required to convert its current meter gauge (1,000 millimeters) railways to the standard gauge (1,435 millimeters), which could handle a larger capacity. Such a conversion, which would require the construction of a completely new railroad, cannot be completed in the short term because Tanzania cannot suspend railway operations and because the country's existing railroad bridges cannot accommodate the wider gauge.

Although Tanzania's railroads currently operate well below their potential capacity, transport along this route could quickly increase if refurbishment makes it a more efficient and reliable mode of transportation. While roads currently carry the bulk of goods along the Central Corridor, it can take trucks four days to travel down the Central Corridor while it takes a train only two. Moreover, by shifting heavy transport from the roads onto the railway, Tanzania can lessen the deterioration of its roads.

Besides a shift in transport from roads to rails, emerging industries and prospective mining projects could also increase the volume of goods transported by rail, requiring a higher-capacity railway network. These mining projects include gold, nickel, copper and uranium projects in Tanzania, as well as other projects farther inland in Burundi, Rwanda or possibly Uganda. Just one of these projects, the Mkuju River project, would raise Tanzania's need for a reliable transport corridor -- it is expected to make Tanzania the world's second-largest producer of uranium. Mantra Resources is expecting to mine 140,000 tons of uranium per year at the site. This is a classic case of a foreign mining operator needing a reliable rail line to export its commodity, and disruptions to these export plans could occur because the local government's capacity to engineer or otherwise complete the rail requirements is lacking.

Apart from improving existing railroads, Tanzania also plans several notable expansions of its railroad network that will either extend into new areas or relieve pressure on the Central Railway Line. One of these projects would extend the Central Corridor's railways into Musongati, Burundi, which would also create a better connection with the Democratic Republic of the Congo's Kivu provinces. Another section of railroad is planned to facilitate transport between Tanga, Arusha and Musoma in Tanzania, along a line running parallel to the border with Kenya. From Musoma on the banks of Lake Victoria, existing ferry connections would offer a direct link with Kampala in Uganda. This latter line would exist separately from the Central Corridor, but its existence would be able to lighten the load on some parts of the Central Corridor infrastructure.

 

Shortcomings at Dar es Salaam

One of the Central Corridor's main constraints regarding capacity is the port of Dar es Salaam. Delays at the port, which is operating near its capacity, can last an average of three or four days. Other constraints along the corridor, such as customs checks at border posts, can easily delay travel times by three quarters of an hour -- or in some places, such as Kabanga along the Tanzanian-Burundian border, by an entire day -- but these are still well below the average delays noted in Dar es Salaam.

Lags in development and in construction of new facilities limit the port's ability to keep up with traffic. The lack of deep-water berths is one of the results of this underdevelopment. Another berth is being constructed at the port, but the area around it is very congested because it is located near the central business district. The unavailability of land behind the berths severely limits the port's future expansion. Other plans have been proposed, such as the development of the port of Maruhubi on the island of Zanzibar as a dedicated container terminal, which would relieve a considerable amount of pressure currently on Dar es Salaam. The Chinese are also breaking ground on the Bagamoyo port project located north of Dar es Salaam that could become a world-class port facility and involve road and rail connections to the Central Corridor.

While most of the Central Corridor operates well below its intended capacity, extensive refurbishing projects are needed to improve performance. Increasing the capacity of the port of Dar es Salaam -- the main bottleneck in the Central Corridor infrastructure -- will also be necessary. Several solutions to these challenges are available, but funding is often difficult to secure and this casts doubt on the feasibility of these projects. However, growing economic activity, both in the primary sectors and in low-end manufacturing in different countries around Lake Victoria, could make these projects along the Central Corridor more important. East African

East African countries naturally compete for foreign investment and economic development. Transport capabilities attract such investments, but cooperation to further develop capabilities and guarantee a certain degree of efficiency has proved necessary to continue to entice critical investments. The region's Northern Corridor continues to draw greater development financing than its Central Corridor because of its heavier traffic. Moreover, the Northern Corridor has always been the most active and reliable corridor in the region, even if it is not terribly efficient. This competition has generated frictions between Tanzania and East African countries along the Northern Corridor as Tanzania works to catch up and position itself as a credible alternative to Kenya while Kenya scrambles for the financing to further develop its infrastructure and secure its regional position.

Analysis

Among transport routes in the East African Community, the largest share of goods pass through the Northern Corridor, which connects the Kenyan port city of Mombasa to Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Ituri province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The route is a remnant of the colonial era, when the British sought to link the Great Lakes region to the Kenyan coast. Today, the transport artery is constrained in its efficiency and capacity, though not as much as the Central Corridor, which runs primarily through Tanzania. The Northern Corridor is particularly important as it passes through the most economically active area of East Africa -- especially the area north of Lake Victoria, which is home to the main concentration of East African agriculture, still the biggest sector in the region by far. Recently, such factors have helped attract complementary investments along the route, further increasing its importance.

As with the Central Corridor, most transport on the Northern Corridor is road-based. The main rail connection, which runs east to west through Kenya and into Uganda, would need to be refurbished or replaced to relieve some of the traffic burden on Northern Corridor roads. While transport by rail is cheaper and -- theoretically, at least -- faster than by road, the line is unreliable and beset with frequent delays.

Still, Northern Corridor railroads function better than those of the Central Corridor. The level of service -- a reflection of the achieved transport speed relative to the design speed -- along the northern route averages around 41 percent, with the main Nairobi-Kampala connection scoring 44 percent. By comparison, the average level of service on the Central Corridor is only 24 percent. This difference is part of the reason why goods from Burundi, for example, that could travel a shorter distance to port through the Central Corridor are often routed through the longer northern artery instead.

Due to the difference in delays and the more robust economic activity along the Northern Corridor, the route accounts for more than twice the amount of goods -- upward of 20 million tons per year -- as the Central Corridor. While countries along each route do not necessarily compete directly for the transport of goods, they do compete for external investments in transport infrastructure or ancillary sectors. Since East Africa is made up of net importer countries, these corridors support projects under development within the region rather than simply providing routes for exports.

 

The Northern Corridor's Growing Significance

Nonetheless, export operations could grow exponentially along the Northern Corridor in the coming years, driven by multiple investment projects underway in the Great Lakes region such as the Mount Kodo iron-ore mining project in the Democratic Republic of the Congo's Ituri province. When completed, the facility is expected to produce somewhere between 25 and 50 million tons of export materials per year. These likely would not affect the port of Mombasa or existing roads and railways in the Northern Corridor; the project will probably require the construction of its own heavy haul railroad and specialized export terminal. Further studies and development are needed before the project can become operational, however, and this is not expected to happen in the next decade.

Other mining projects could increase traffic along the Northern Corridor more immediately, though most of the traffic will support the development of the mining facilities rather than the exporting of raw materials. One sector likely to contribute to traffic is the gold mining industry in Ituri. The Congolese province currently taps into the Northern Corridor through the Ugandan town of Gulu, from which the railway runs all the way to Mombasa. The high grade of gold ore found in this location makes it very attractive, but development is constrained by transport limitations, insecurity and a lack of transparency and reliability on the part of the Congolese government. The small amount of output from this sector will limit the importance of transport capabilities mostly to the provisioning of ongoing mining activities. Thus, while the Democratic Republic of the Congo wants to scale up gold mining in Ituri, doing so would require more reliable infrastructure.

Additional infrastructure improvements will be especially vital to Uganda and Kenya's development as manufacturing hubs, since their population centers are not situated directly on the coast. The countries are forced to move industrial products, steel, boilers and other manufacturing equipment farther inland, and they will need to find ways to do so cheaply to stay competitive. Cost will also be a factor in exporting their manufactured goods. Uganda and Kenya are attractive as potential manufacturing hubs because of the low cost of operations. However, the current transport infrastructure is so poor that it effectively cancels out the appeal of the large, cheap and stable workforces in the countries. Improving the transportation network is thus a prerequisite for manufacturing to move there.

Planned Expansions along the Northern Corridor

To increase transport capacity and allow Kenya and Uganda to continue attracting economic activity to the region around the Northern Corridor, the Kenyan government hopes to complete the construction of a standard gauge railway along the trajectory of the existing rail line by 2018. Unlike Tanzania, which also has been considering replacing its central railway with a standard gauge line, Kenya has already taken the first steps in the process. The country has already secured a $3.75 billion loan from China -- $2.5 billion for construction of the railway and $1.25 billion for locomotives and carriages. The project will give Kenya -- which already is home to the most important sections of the Northern Corridor -- with a line capable of providing a higher level of service and a higher capacity.

One of the more ambitious projects taking place mainly in Kenya, the Lamu Port Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor, will take some strain off Northern Corridor infrastructure. The new project's roads, railways and pipelines would accommodate primarily traffic heading to and from South Sudan and Ethiopia, rather than Uganda and other countries further inland in the Great Lakes region. This would allow some diversification of rail and road transport within Kenya, but most important, the establishment of the port in the town of Lamu could relieve some of the pressure on the Port of Mombasa. However, the entire project has been hampered by several political constraints and a hefty price tag in excess of $22 billion, for which financing has yet to be secured despite Kenya's concerted efforts to attract funding from China, Japan and Europe.

As with Dar es Salaam on the Central Corridor, the Port of Mombasa's position as the Northern Corridor's main exit and entry for goods greatly limits the routes capacity. Mombasa does slightly better than Dar es Salaam, with average delays of only two to three days compared to three to four days Tanzanian port, and the Kenyan port also handles a larger amount of cargo. However, Mombasa is as limited as Dar es Salaam in further development due to a lack of space behind its berths, and the size of ships that can enter the port is limited by a lack of depth in the approach channel. An increase in vessel sizes has led to greater development of hub ports and feeder ports, with ports like Mombasa and Dar es Salaam remaining feeders due to their inability to accommodate deep-draught, post-Panamax (the size limit for ships passing through the Panama Canal) vessels. The Port of Lamu will be able to accommodate post-Panamax vessels once completed.

The ship size limitations, along with the congestion at Mombasa, could thus be alleviated by the expansion of the Lamu Port. Creating specialized ports, with Lamu focusing on bulk cargoes while Mombasa focuses on container handling, would increase efficiency in two ways: Deeper berths at Lamu could allow Kenya to accommodate larger types of vessels, while moving bulk goods through Lamu would free up much-needed space in Mombasa to expand its container operations. However, attempting to establish Mombasa as a regional container hub would create direct competition with Tanzania's less-realistic plans to develop its Maruhubi Port as a regional container hub.

Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto were joined by Lamu leaders on August 1, to witness the signing of the contracts between Kenya Ports Authority and China Communication Construction Company for the construction of the first three berths of Lamu Port.

“The commencement of this project reinforces government’s resolve to make infrastructure a key facilitator of our social and economic development,” said Kenyatta.

“The signing of this contract is a major milestone in delivering the LAPSSET Corridor Program as well as achieving Kenya’s Vision 2030. The construction of the first three berths will present a strong case and trigger for participation of the private sector in construction of the remaining 29 berths and other components of the corridor,” he added.

Under the plans, the port will be able to handle some 24 million tonnes of cargo a year from giant container ships, as well as provide infrastructure to support oil discoveries made in Kenya’s a